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Abstract 
We study determinants of sovereign portfolios of Spanish banks over a long time-span, starting 
in 2008. Our findings challenge the view that banks engaged in moral hazard strategies to 
exploit the regulatory treatment of sovereign exposures. In particular, we show that being a 
weakly capitalized bank is not related to higher holdings of domestic sovereign debt. While 
a strong link is present between central bank liquidity support and sovereign holdings, 
opportunistic strategies or reach-for-yield behavior appear to be limited to the non-domestic 
sovereign portfolio of well-capitalized banks, which might have taken advantage of their higher 
risk-bearing capacity to gain exposure (via central bank liquidity) to the set of riskier sovereign 
bonds. Furthermore, we document that financial fragmentation in EMU markets has played a 
key role in reshaping sovereign portfolios of banks. Overall, our results have important 
implications for the ongoing discussion on the optimal design of the risk-weighted capital 
framework of banks. 
Keywords: banks’ sovereign holdings, sovereign crisis, moral hazard, central bank liquidity, 
EMU financial fragmentation. 
JEL Classification: G01, G21, H63. 
 
 
  
Resumen 
Estudiamos los determinantes de las tenencias de bonos soberanos de los bancos españoles 
sobre un período prolongado, que comienza en 2008. Nuestros resultados cuestionan la 
hipótesis de que los bancos decidieron sus estrategias de inversión en función de factores de 
riesgo moral, explotando el tratamiento regulatorio de las exposiciones soberanas. En 
concreto, mostramos que no hay relación entre un nivel bajo de capitalización bancaria y 
unas tenencias más elevadas de deuda soberana nacional. Aunque existe un fuerte vínculo 
entre el apoyo del banco central, a través de sus programas de liquidez, y las tenencias de 
deuda soberana, los comportamientos de tipo oportunista, o de búsqueda de rentabilidad, 
parecen limitarse a la cartera de deuda soberana extranjera de los bancos mejor 
capitalizados. Estos podrían haberse beneficiado de su mayor capacidad de absorción de 
riesgos para aumentar su exposición (vía liquidez del banco central) a los bonos soberanos 
más arriesgados. Por otro lado, también documentamos que la fragmentación financiera 
en los mercados de la zona del euro ha desempeñado un papel clave en la composición de 
las carteras soberanas. Nuestros resultados tienen implicaciones importantes para la 
discusión en curso sobre el diseño óptimo del tratamiento regulatorio de las exposiciones 
soberanas. 
Palabras clave: tenencias bancarias de deuda soberana, crisis soberana, riesgo moral, 
liquidez del banco central, fragmentación financiera en la zona del euro. 
Códigos JEL: G01, G21, H63. 
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1 Introduction 
The 2010-2012 European sovereign crisis coincided with a strong upsurge of domestic 
sovereign exposures of banks based in distressed countries. What drives sovereign debt 
portfolios in a crisis context? Some authors claim that undercapitalized banks took advantage 
of the particular design of prudential regulation, which assigns a zero risk-weight to domestic 
sovereign exposures (see, for instance, Acharya and Steffen, 2015). According to their view, 
those weak banks would have made risky bets on distressed sovereign debt, sometimes  
with the purpose of generating sufficient profits to avoid a default (gambling for resurrection), 
other times simply to boost profitability through carry trade. Whatever the ultimate reason, 
these authors argue that the banks that followed this strategy did not internalize bad outcomes, 
in which the credit quality of distressed sovereigns would further deteriorate. If and when the 
risk had materialized, resulting losses in sovereign portfolios might have ended up being shared 
with banks´ creditors, or even taxpayers. Thus, this strand of the literature links the increase in 
holdings of distressed sovereign debt during the crisis to the execution of moral hazard or risk-
shifting strategies.  
In our paper, we empirically study to what extent the above-mentioned statements are 
supported by the data using a very granular dataset with information from Spanish banks, 
starting in 2008. We go beyond the period of sovereign turmoil, which ensures that our 
conclusions are not delimited to this crisis-event (although we also test the validity of  
our findings in that period). Contrary to other papers, we also consider holdings of non-
domestic debt to enrich the analysis. Spain is a perfect “laboratory” for this exercise: tensions 
in the sovereign market followed the real estate crisis, which put the banking industry under 
strong profitability pressures against a backdrop of reduced lending opportunities in the 
economy. In this context, banks´ holdings of Spanish sovereign debt augmented sharply. 
However, not all banks were symmetrically affected by the economic crisis. Stronger 
international players and some more prudent domestic players were able to weather the crisis 
in better conditions. This cross-sectional heterogeneity is essential to assess how weaker and 
stronger banks reacted to the same shocks. In addition, the fact that the Eurosystem was an 
active lender of last resort in this period adds an interesting dimension to the study. 
We start by discussing some relevant graphical evidence on the evolution of sovereign 
debt holdings of larger EMU banking systems, including a breakdown of non-domestic 
sovereign debt holdings between debt issued by distressed and non-distressed governments 
in the EMU, or by countries more and less affected by the crisis (MAC and LAC, respectively). 
The latter set of data is obtained from the Securities Holdings Statistics by Sector (SHSS) of the 
ECB, which collects (at the ISIN level) holdings of debt of different institutional sectors in each 
jurisdiction, including banks. The data shows the well-known fact that banks in MAC countries 
augmented domestic bond holdings during the sovereign crisis period. We also observe that, 
at the height of the sovereign crisis, banks from MAC countries got rid of a substantial part of 
their non-domestic MAC debt portfolios. This result is striking. If, according to some authors, 
there was a bet on domestic sovereign bonds, why did banks not extend the bet to non-
domestic MAC debt? Thus, considering both domestic and non-domestic sovereign debt 
holdings is key to answer this question. 
Our empirical exercise exploits a rich dataset obtained from confidential supervisory 
reporting data, which offers an extensive coverage of sovereign portfolios and other relevant 
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balance sheet items of Spanish banks. With this dataset, we control for several time-varying 
bank-level variables, including size, international activity, solvency and banks´ complexity, 
ensuring that we are able to disentangle moral hazard motivations from alternative drivers of 
purchases of sovereign bonds. In addition, we consider several relevant macro-financial 
variables to control for overall business conditions, drawing information from private and public 
data sources. Within the former group of variables, we introduce a novel indicator developed 
by the ECB (ECB, 2018), which measures financial fragmentation in EMU markets, or price 
dispersion across countries of in theory very similar assets. We argue that this variable captures 
inter alia EMU break-up concerns. An increase in financial fragmentation could result in a “re-
nationalization” of sovereign portfolios (Angelini et al., 2014), or a substitution of non-domestic 
debt for domestic debt. 
In our initial set of regressions, the dependent variable is the quarterly change in 
domestic sovereign debt banks’ holdings. We first assess whether moral hazard (risk-shifting) 
mechanisms alla Altavilla et al (2017) played a role in redrawing banks´ sovereign portfolios. In 
this respect, we do not find evidence in favor of moral hazard. First, we find that being a poorly 
capitalized bank is not associated with higher holdings of domestic sovereign bonds. In 
addition, we show that weak banks did not take advantage of depressed market 
conditions/sentiment to expand their portfolios of sovereign bonds. Finally, we document a 
positive link between bank-level central bank funding and (the growth of) sovereign debt 
holdings. This might give the impression that banks engaged in carry trade/opportunistic 
strategies alla Acharya and Steffen (2015), using proceeds from Eurosystem lending operations 
to invest in high-yield sovereign debt. The relationship central bank liquidity-sovereign bonds is, 
however, unrelated to the capital level of banks, which suggests that the moral hazard 
hypothesis does not hold. 
Our analysis concludes that macroeconomic factors, rather than opportunistic 
strategies, play an important role in sovereign holdings. In particular, banks tend to increment 
(domestic) sovereign holdings during downturns (when GDP drops), and decrease these holdings 
in upturns. Interestingly, financial fragmentation in the EMU also explains higher holdings of 
domestic sovereign debt. We associate this behavior with a search for “hedge”: elevated 
fragmentation in financial markets reflect the risk of an EMU break-up, or the risk of a 
redenomination of banks´ balance sheet items from euros to new national currencies. In this 
context and to prevent currency mismatches, banks have an incentive to re-nationalize their 
(sovereign) portfolios. In addition, self-preservation motives (ESRB, 2015) may also push banks 
to increase their domestic sovereign debt holdings to reduce the likelihood of an event that 
would have devastating consequences for them, regardless of their domestic sovereign 
exposures (see also Andreeva and Vlassopoulos, 2016). 
Lastly, we look further into the moral hazard hypothesis by exploring the behavior of 
distressed banks. In our framework, an institution in distress is characterized by a weak level of 
capital, and a high level of non-performing loans (NPLs), both expressed in relative terms with 
respect to its peers. Of course, high NPL levels reflect bad past decisions (granting low-quality 
loans), but might also indicate that the set of investment/lending opportunities of a bank has 
narrowed down: a bank may not be able to find solvent borrowers in its traditional market 
niche, and it may even be harder to reach other markets under a general economic recession. 
In our empirical exercise, we find that distressed institutions have a stronger propensity to pile 
up domestic sovereign bonds. We link this relationship to the particular portfolio constrains that 
this set of banks confronts rather than to moral hazard behavior. 
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We perform several robustness checks to confirm the validity of our results. First of all, 
we formally study the preference of banks for 1) holding domestic versus non-domestic EMU 
sovereign debt (propensity to domestic concentration1), and 2) holding non-domestic MAC 
debt in detriment of LAC debt (preference for higher-yielding sovereign securities). This analysis 
serves us to double check the validity of our main findings, but it also offers some interesting 
new insights. In particular, we study the preference for holding domestic sovereign debt instead 
of debt with similar risk-return characteristics (non-domestic MAC debt), thus controlling for 
moral suasion mechanisms alla Altavilla et al (2017), according to which some public authority 
would be pushing banks towards holding more domestic sovereign debt. Our results do not 
offer support for the presence of moral suasion or moral hazard mechanisms. Financial 
fragmentation, on the contrary, emerges as a major driver of domestic concentration. Finally, 
our results are consistent with the execution of opportunistic strategies in the non-domestic 
debt portfolio. These strategies would be led by well-capitalized banks, or banks with higher 
risk-bearing capacity. 
Our results are further robust to alternative specifications. In particular, we examine 
their validity at the height of the sovereign crisis, and we find that they firmly hold. Interestingly, 
in this period there is modest evidence that banks followed contrarian strategies in the 
sovereign market, buying sovereign debt when prices were more depressed. This could be 
consistent with the view that banks are willing to support sectors in distress for which they hold 
large exposures, a channel recently documented by Giannetti and Saidi (2017) for industries in 
distress. As before, the relationship prices-sovereign holdings is unrelated to banks’ capital 
levels. On another level, our results are robust to different strategies for identifying the set of 
weakly capitalized banks. Lastly, our findings hold when controlling for the behavior of banks 
that during the crisis were acquired by other institutions (in the main body of the paper, we 
consider them as part of their current banking group). 
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to confront at the same time bank-
level factors (similarly to Altavilla et al., 2017) together with the impact of financial fragmentation 
in EMU to explain changes in sovereign bond holdings. It is also the first that empirically shows 
that the latter element, rather than opportunistic strategies, was determinant in explaining home 
bias behavior (propensity to hold domestic bonds instead of foreign securities) during the crisis, 
confirming the hypothesis enunciated by Angelini et al. (2014). In line with Peydró et al. (2017), 
we also find evidence that banks dealt with domestic and non-domestic sovereign debt in a 
different fashion, and that well-capitalized banks could bet on high-yield, non-domestic MAC 
bonds using proceeds from Eurosystem lending operations. Finally, the finding that distressed 
banks with high levels of non-performing assets buy more (domestic) sovereign bonds is an 
important one. It suggests that portfolio constraints, i.e. the lack of investment opportunities in 
the economy, could drive sovereign bonds holdings. This, in turn, could challenge moral 
hazard/gambling for resurrection theories (see, for instance, Acharya and Steffen, 2015). 
On the policy front, we think that our research might contribute to the ongoing 
discussion on the optimal risk-weighted capital framework of banks (see BCBS, 2018). In 
particular, the finding that banks increased their sovereign debt holdings when market 
sentiment was depressed and no other investors were willing to step in adds an interesting 
dimension to the discussion about the so-called “diabolic loop” or the nexus between 
sovereign risk and bank credit risk. This term is used to refer to the fact that strains in one of 
the two sectors, the sovereign or the banking sector, feed tensions in the other (see, for 
                                                                          
1 Other authors have also studied home bias of banks´ sovereign portfolios in the Eurozone crisis context. See, for 
instance, Battistini et al. (2014) or Horváth et al. (2015). 
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instance, Acharya et al., 2014). Since the nexus might be more intense when banks hold large 
sovereign exposures, the idea of imposing penalties on the latter has gained ground in the 
policy discussion. However, our research reveals a novel feature of the nexus: in a crisis 
context, domestic banks could help stabilize the sovereign market (see Angelini et al., 2014, for 
similar findings in the case of Italy). This, in turn, translates into financial stability dividends.  
Our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a rationale of why banks decide 
to hold sovereign bonds in a crisis context. Section 3 describes the evolution of sovereign 
portfolios of larger EMU banking systems, including the Spanish banking system. Section 4 
describes the data and presents the empirical study. Section 5 incorporates some extensions 
and robustness tests. Finally, section 6 concludes. 
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2 Why do banks hold sovereign debt in a crisis context? 
In a crisis context, banks gain exposure to distressed sovereign debt for different reasons. After 
a thorough review of the literature, we can summarize the channels that could be present in the 
following list: 
I. Moral hazard or risk-shifting channel. The asymmetric nature of the pay-offs of 
distressed sovereign bonds would give undercapitalized banks a strong incentive to 
invest in this market segment (Drechsler et al., 2016). In the good states of nature, 
strained sovereigns honor their debt and banks´ shareholders cash in the (sometimes 
substantial) credit risk premium embedded in these securities. In the bad states, 
though, distressed sovereigns default and subsequent losses in poorly capitalized 
institutions end up being shared between shareholders and creditors. Thus, 
according to this channel, a transfer of risks (from shareholders to debt holders, and 
ultimately to taxpayers) seems to operate when weak institutions invest in distressed 
sovereign bonds. Acharya and Steffen (2015) further suggest that the appeal of 
holding these bonds would be amplified by the design of the credit risk framework of 
Basilea, which assigns a zero risk-weight to sovereign exposures irrespective of the 
associated credit risk.2 
II. Non-moral hazard hypotheses, comprising two modalities:  
a. Execution of opportunistic strategies. As other investors, banks would be 
screening opportunities in the marketplace in view of their risk-return preferences. 
If yields rise sufficiently for sovereign debt, banks would gain exposure to this 
segment to seize what they perceive as a valuable market opportunity. Thus, at 
times of stress, reach-for-yield behavior could play a role in the set-up of 
sovereign portfolios.3 
 
b. Role of central bank liquidity. The build-up of sovereign debt holdings might be 
facilitated by the availability of central bank liquidity, particularly if provided at 
favorable terms (Brutti and Sauré, 2016). When this happens, opportunistic 
strategies could still be present but interact with exogenous interventions by the 
central bank, which targets price stability. In parallel, banks might tap Eurosystem 
loans and buy sovereign debt to increase their collateral cushion (liquidity 
hoarding), deteriorated in a crisis context (Peydró et al., 2017). This is clearly 
dissociated from opportunistic behavior. 
 
Before introducing the empirical section, we address two potential concerns related to the 
identification of the aforementioned channels. 
a. Do moral hazard and opportunistic behavior overlap? Our answer is no. 
Opportunistic behavior is in some aspects observationally equivalent to moral 
                                                                          
2 Risk-weight of sovereign bonds issued by non-domestic issuers can also be set at 0%. For instance, for any banking 
system based in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), bonds denominated in euros and issued by the central 
government of other EMU jurisdictions receive the same regulatory treatment as domestic government debt. 
3 Alternatively and in light of risk-return considerations, banks might increase sovereign debt holdings in detriment of 
other exposures, including credit to the private sector. Our paper, however, does not address real effects. Thus, we do 
not study this channel. 
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hazard: banks buy distressed sovereign debt and capture the extra yield of this 
asset class. But it differs from the moral hazard hypothesis in the central aspect that 
undercapitalized institutions do not lead distressed bonds purchases, i.e. either 
strong banks do it (taking advantage of their higher risk-bearing capacity) or simply 
all institutions embrace opportunistic strategies, irrespective of their capital level. 
 
b. Omitted variable bias: presence of macro shocks. We note that, beyond the 
previous channels, sovereign holdings might be sensitive to macro-financial or 
overall conditions. Channels of transmission of macro shocks are multifaceted. For 
instance, the lack of solvent credit demand during downturns would narrow down 
the set of banks’ investment opportunities, which would react by increasing their 
sovereign exposures (Castro and Mencía, 2014). Furthermore, in connection with 
the particular set-up of the EMU, tensions in the sovereign market might  
introduce the perception that the monetary union is not irreversible (fears of an 
EMU break-up). The resulting financial fragmentation could lead banks to increase 
their domestic sovereign debt holdings, a “natural” hedge against the risk of 
redenomination in banks´ balance sheets (Angelini et al., 2014). In our empirical 
exercise, we treat macro factors as common shocks to banks, and deal with them 
either by introducing different time-varying macro variables or with time fixed 
effects. Together with bank-level controls, this approach should allow us to 
disentangle moral hazard behavior from the alternative channels.  
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3 Graphical evidence: sovereign portfolios in Spain and other EMU countries 
This section describes some stylized facts relating to banks’ sovereign debt holdings. While our 
empirical exercise focuses on Spanish banks, here we present a concise description of the 
evolution of sovereign debt holdings for the whole EMU. This will show that some 
developments in Spanish banks´ sovereign portfolios, like the increase in home bias over the 
sample period, largely mirror dynamics in other jurisdictions, especially in more-affected- 
by-the-crisis (MAC) countries. Based on these similarities, we argue that the more formal 
results that we obtain in the subsequent sections of the paper using Spanish data provide 
conclusions that are also valid in a broader context. 
We use the following data sources: balance sheet items are obtained from the Statistical 
Data Warehouse (SDW) of the ECB and the Bruegel database of Eurosystem lending operations 
developed by Pisani-Ferry and Wolff (2012), while macroeconomic and financial variables are 
obtained from Eurostat and Reuters. We also add a breakdown of non-domestic EMU sovereign 
debt holdings for each banking system. This granularity is provided by the SHSS of the ECB, an 
innovative and proprietary database which collects, among other, holdings of debt of different 
institutional sectors in each jurisdiction, including banks, at the ISIN level. 
As is widely known, EMU banks augmented their holdings of domestic sovereign 
bonds following the financial crisis (figure 1). The increase was more pronounced in MAC 
banking systems, including the Spanish one, than in less-affected-by-the-crisis (LAC) systems: 
holdings in the former more than tripled since the aftermath of the financial crisis, while the 
upsurge of domestic debt holdings in LAC systems was more modest.4 In both cases, 
however, the tendency to accumulate domestic bonds halted at the end of 2013. 
Which are the driving forces behind this re-composition of banks´ portfolios? The 
following figures offer initial insights founded on the theoretical discussion from the previous 
sections. Figure 2 displays the Return on Equity of the largest EMU banking systems as well as 
sovereign yields in 2012Q2, when they hit record levels in the MAC markets. The figure illustrates 
that profitability pressures were stronger in the MAC area at the peak of sovereign strains (higher 
sovereign yields, lower profitability in the banking sector), when sovereign spreads escalated 
sharply. On the other hand, figure 3 shows the use by banks of Eurosystem lending operations 
as well as their holdings of domestic sovereign debt. These two variables grew at a similar 
pace until the end of 2012, when compression in MAC yields sped up. Finally, figure 4 shows 
the evolution of GDP in MAC and LAC countries, together with holdings of domestic sovereign 
bonds. With activity falling across the board at critical moments, like after the advent of the 
financial crisis or during the period of more acute sovereign strains, banks might have needed 
to resort to sovereign securities to maintain the value of their asset portfolio. This link seems to 
be stronger in the MAC area, where activity was hit more severely. 
Finally, we also analyse holdings of non-domestic bonds issued by EMU governments, 
differentiating between holdings of debt issued by LAC (figure 5) and MAC countries (figure 6). 
While holdings of LAC country bonds remained relatively stable over the sample period (apart 
from an uptick in the after-crisis period), holdings of MAC debt appear to be negatively 
                                                                          
4 Countries are classified as MAC or LAC according to Altavilla et al. (2017). LAC countries are Austria, Belgium, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Malta, The Netherlands and Slovakia. MAC countries are Cyprus, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain. 
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correlated with domestic bond holdings: coinciding with the outbreak of the sovereign crisis, 
banks reduced their exposure to this type of debt (as domestic debt holdings augmented), 
while this dynamic somewhat reversed in the final years of the sample (in these years, domestic 
debt holdings stopped growing). This result is interesting since it shows that home bias 
prevailed over the incentive to gain the credit risk premium of non-domestic distressed 
sovereign debt, especially in MAC countries. It further suggests that confronting domestic and 
non-domestic debt holdings could clarify the determinants behind changes in sovereign 
exposures. 
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4 Empirical exercise 
4.1 The data 
Our empirical exercise aims to examine the hypotheses outlined in section 2. For this purpose, 
we consider quarterly observations from 2008Q1 to 2016Q4 on domestic sovereign debt 
holdings as well as other relevant balance sheet items of Spanish banks, together with macro-
financial variables for Spain and the EMU. In this way, we formally study the determinants of 
debt holdings beyond the period of more acute sovereign strains, which is usually the target of 
the most recent literature. We also provide some rationale about why banks decide to hold 
domestic instead of non-domestic sovereign bonds, which will help enrich our analysis. 
Our data refer to the fourteen significant institutions identified in Spain as of the end of 
2016.5 Each banking group is treated as a single unit according to its composition as of 2016Q4 
to control for the intense activity of banking mergers and acquisitions in recent years.6 This 
ensures that the sample covers the vast majority of banks´ assets in Spain (on average, we cover 
96% of total banking assets over the sample period). For this set of banks, we obtain sovereign 
holdings and balance sheet items on a consolidated basis from their confidential reporting 
statements to Banco de España (Table 1, panel A).7 The previous set of data is complemented 
with market and macro indicators obtained from Reuters and Eurostat (Table 1, panel B).  
With regard to bank-level variables, we go beyond the standard controls related to 
size and solvency and try to capture in addition key elements of banks´ business models. This 
is important, since some Spanish banks are global institutions with a large set of subsidiaries 
and branches operating abroad, while other institutions function almost exclusively in the 
domestic market. International banks might be more prone to diversify their sovereign 
portfolios; consequently, we introduce a control related to the cross-border activity of banks. In 
addition, some institutions focus on the more traditional business model of taking deposits 
from the public and granting loans, while others are more active conducting market making 
services, providing credit to other banks in interbank markets or trading in the derivatives 
markets. The latter might be less prone to concentrating bond holdings in the domestic 
sovereign segment, since their greater resources might allow them to identify other profitable 
opportunities. Complexity, thus, should be taken on board. We do so by considering aspects 
like the weight of derivatives in banks’ balance sheets or the prevalence of market-based 
versus retail sources of funding. 
4.2 Moral hazard versus alternative channels 
We begin with a specification that partially follows the strategy of Altavilla et al. (2017), who test 
the validity of the moral hazard hypothesis for a sample of European banks. Our proposed 
equation is as follows: 
 
                                                                          
5 List of significant Spanish institutions, in alphabetical order, according to the Single Supervisory Mechanism: ABANCA 
Holding Financiero S.A., Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A., Banco de Sabadell, S.A., BFA Tenedora De Acciones 
S.A.U., Banco Mare Nostrum, S.A, Banco Santander, S.A., Banco Popular Español, S.A., Bankinter, S.A., Ibercaja 
Banco, S.A., Criteria Caixa S.A.U., Banco de Crédito Social Cooperativo, S.A., Kutxabank, S.A., Liberbank, S.A. and 
Unicaja Banco, S.A. 
6 Nevertheless, we also re-estimate the main regressions without merging banks backwards in the robustness checks 
section. 
7 The panel is unbalanced due to some data gaps on balance sheet items at the beginning of the sample. 
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Yit = αi + β1WEAKit-1 + β2Price10Yt + β3Price10Yt	* 	WEAKit-1+ β4CBfundingit 
+ β5CBfundingit * WEAKit-1	+	β6GDPt-1+	ߜXit-1 + ߝit	                              (1) 
The dependent variable Yit is the quarterly percentage change in holdings of domestic 
sovereign bonds of bank i in quarter t.8 To avoid that the results are driven by outliers, we 
impose a cap on portfolio growth equal to 100% QoQ. WEAK is a dummy that identifies banks 
with a (lagged) capital Tier 1 ratio below the median value across the sample of banks on the 
same period (for these banks, WEAK = 1; otherwise, WEAK = 0). Price10Y is the quarterly 
percentage change in the price of the 10 year on-the-run Spanish government bond, with which 
we aim to capture the relative attractiveness of sovereign debt (lower prices increase the appeal 
of debt, as it becomes cheaper –yields to maturity increase in these circumstances).9 CBfunding, 
on the other hand, is the quarterly variation of funding from Eurosystem lending operations, 
expressed as a percentage of the total assets of each bank.10 GDP is the (lagged) annual 
percentage change in Gross Domestic Product and stands as our macro-financial control. 
Besides, the specification incorporates a vector of (lagged) bank-level variables to control for the 
different business models and characteristics of banks (Xit-1), including solvency (Tier 1 ratio and 
its interaction with WEAK), complexity (derivatives in the asset side of the balance sheet and the 
structure of liabilities of each institution- deposit, interbank, bond and the stock of net central 
bank funding-, divided by total assets) and international activity (exposures to other jurisdictions 
over total assets). Bank-fixed effects (αi	) are further included to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity across banks. We cluster standard errors at the bank level. 
Our model allows us to test the group of hypotheses labelled previously: 
I. The moral hazard proposition holds if weak banks 1) invest more in domestic 
sovereign debt than other institutions (β1 > 0) and/or 2) engage in contrarian 
strategies, buying (selling) bonds after a drop (an increase) in debt prices, when 
peers do not follow such strategies, or do so but to a lesser extent (β3 < 0, when 
the sum of β2 and β3 is also negative). Besides, moral hazard could be present if 
weak banks use the proceeds from central bank lending operations to invest in 
domestic sovereign debt, again when, ceteris paribus, stronger banks adopt a 
different strategy or resort to this mechanism less intensively (β5 > 0, if the sum of 
β4 and β5 is also positive). The key behind this channel is that weak banks take 
the lead in capturing the credit spread embedded in sovereign bonds. 
 
II. Set of non-moral hazard hypotheses. Banks follow contrarian or opportunistic 
strategies but the moral hazard proposition does not hold when β2 < 0 and β3 is 
non-negative. Non-moral hazard strategies might also be present (including, but 
not only, opportunistic behavior) if the relationship between holdings of debt and 
funding from the central bank is positive for the whole banking system (β4 > 0).11 
To alleviate potential moral hazard concerns, β5 should be non-positive. In sum, 
                                                                          
8 Holdings of (distressed) domestic sovereign bonds are particularly suitable for testing moral hazard behavior. In the 
good states in which macro conditions improve, banks´ balance sheets benefit from a “double dividend”: not only 
sovereign spreads abate but also the level of non-performing loans. In the bad scenario, banks are hit by the double 
blow of impaired sovereign debt holdings and higher non-performing loans. The contending outcomes show that 
domestic sovereign debt is more likely to be the target of risk-shifting strategies (Crosignani, 2017). 
9 Price changes obtained by multiplying yield changes in the benchmark security times its duration. 
10 We use consolidated data on central bank funding as a proxy for funds drawn from Eurosystem lending operations. 
Central bank funding is adjusted for deposits made with central banks. 
11 In the sample period, yields of Spanish sovereign bonds at any maturity over two years have been generally higher 
than the cost of drawing funds from main Eurosystem lending operations. Thus, banks had the possibility of engaging 
in carry trades, capturing the spread between the yield of Spanish bonds and the funding costs of repo operations. 
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for this hypothesis to hold undercapitalized banks should be at most replicating 
the strategies of stronger/well-capitalized institutions. 
 
Finally, banks are expected to increase sovereign exposures during downturns in the 
business cycle. The condition is satisfied when the coefficient associated with our macro 
control (changes in GDP) is negative: β6 < 0. 
4.2.1  RESULTS 
Table 2 tests the previous hypotheses. Column 1 displays the estimated coefficient associated 
with WEAK (β1). The estimate is not significantly different from zero, which suggests that 
purchases of sovereign debt do not depend on banks´ capital.12 
Column 2 adds the estimates of the coefficients for Price10Y (β2) and for the 
interaction between WEAK and Price10Y (β3), as well as the estimates of the coefficients linked 
to CBfunding (β4) and to the interaction between the latter variable and WEAK (β5). The first 
two estimates (β2 and β3) are far from significant at the standard confidence levels, which 
implies that banks, including those defined as WEAK, did not leverage on falling prices in 
government debt to expand their sovereign portfolios.13 In contrast, funding from central banks 
retains a significant role in explaining changes in debt holdings: the estimate of β4 is positive 
and highly significant. Of course, the immediate question is whether the moral hazard 
hypothesis could hold, namely if poorly capitalized banks made a more intense use of the 
former mechanism. The answer from the regression to this question is no: we find that the 
estimate of β5 is not significant at the relevant confidence levels.  
Column 3 includes the full set of variables as well as the estimate of β6, the coefficient 
associated with our macro control (GDP). The estimate is negative and largely significant.  
Taken together, macro-financial conditions and central bank liquidity have played a 
role in redrawing sovereign portfolios of Spanish banks. For now, we remain silent on whether 
the latter relationship (central bank funding-sovereign exposures) is driven by opportunistic 
strategies or whether other motivations apply (we will revisit this issue later on).14 Finally, 
evidence on moral hazard is absent. 
4.2.2  IS FINANCIAL FRAGMENTATION A DRIVER OF DOMESTIC BOND PURCHASES? 
Financial fragmentation in a monetary union ultimately relates to the risk of redenomination, or 
the risk of a change in the currency in which assets (including holdings of sovereign debt) and 
liabilities of banks are denominated. If the risk materializes, assets issued under national law 
would presumably be converted to the new national currency, which in turn might create 
currency mismatches between the two sides of banks´ balance sheets. Thus, when the risk of 
redenomination is substantial, banks have a strong incentive to tilt the sovereign portfolio 
towards domestic bonds (Angelini et al., 2014). Importantly, this motivation might also exist 
even when the risk of a currency conversion is not imminent, but financial fragmentation 
remains a concern. For instance, in a scenario of low conversion risk, the presence of non-
negligible interest rate differentials across EMU markets, a symptom of financial fragmentation, 
                                                                          
12 Besides, neither the estimate of the coefficient of T1 nor the estimate of the coefficient of the interaction between 
WEAK and T1 are statistically significant. 
13 This result is robust to different metrics, including price changes in the 5 year benchmark or the level of sovereign 
spreads at different maturities (not reported). 
14 We also find that the estimate of bond funding (bank-level control) is positive and significant in columns 1 and 2. This could 
be related to the mechanics of repo operations with the Eurosystem, which allowed banks to post retained bonds as 
collateral to obtain liquidity. The significance of the coefficient, however, vanishes when we control for macro factors. 
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translates into a myriad of banks´ funding costs at the country level. This might condition the 
allocation of sovereign portfolios between domestic and non-domestic debt. In particular, 
banks based in higher-yielding markets might be more prone to bias their sovereign portfolios 
towards domestic bonds because, given their funding costs, this set of bonds offers better ex 
ante returns than the alternative of investing in lower-yielding, non-domestic sovereign debt. 
We introduce a new variable, Fragmentation, to assess the impact of financial 
fragmentation in EMU markets on holdings of domestic sovereign debt. Fragmentation is 
derived from a synthetic measure developed by the ECB (see ECB, 2018; and Hoffmann et al., 
2016), which collects data on prices of instruments issued in different market segments 
(money, bond, equity and banking markets) of each EMU country. Following a predefined 
methodology, the ECB computes measures of prices dispersion across jurisdictions. On the 
assumption that higher (lower) values of prices dispersion of (in theory) very similar financial 
assets signal less (more) financial integration, the ECB develops an index bounded between 
cero and one. Our derived variable is designed to be close to one when financial fragmentation 
is high, and near zero when financial fragmentation recedes.15 Figure 7 shows the historical 
evolution of this fragmentation proxy over the sample period. As expected, this measure 
deteriorated in the aftermath of the financial crisis and particularly at the height of the sovereign 
crisis. Later, it recovered in parallel to the stabilization of EMU sovereign markets. 
In column 4 of Table 2, we replace GDP with the new variable, Fragmentation. To deal 
with endogeneity concerns, the estimation is conducted using the first lag of this variable. The 
estimate of the coefficient associated with Fragmentation is statistically significant and positive, 
which implies that when financial fragmentation augments, banks buy domestic sovereign 
bonds. This supports the intuitive idea that financial fragmentation in EMU, including fears of a 
break-up of the euro, increases the propensity to hold domestic bonds in banks´ portfolios. 
Apart from this outcome, regression results are fairly aligned with those of previous 
specifications.16 
4.2.3 UPSURGE OF SOVEREIGN EXPOSURES DURING THE V-LTRO PERIOD AND DRIVERS 
The two very long-term refinancing operations (V-LTRO) conducted by the Eurosystem in 
2011Q4 and 2012Q1 respectively, in which banks had access to ample central bank liquidity at 
very favorable conditions,17 provide a very interesting natural experiment to test our set of 
hypotheses (in our sample of banks, domestic debt holdings increased 22%QoQ in this 
period). Coinciding with these operations, sovereign spreads in EMU MAC markets hit record 
levels. How did these elements condition banks´ portfolio choices? Did any moral hazard 
mechanism pop up in the V-LTRO period? 
The regression results shown in Table 3 address these questions. The new group of 
regressions are an extended version of equation (1), in which we complement the variable 
CBfunding with different sets of dummies. In particular, in column 1 we introduce a dummy 
equal to 1 in 2011Q4 and 2012Q1 (LTRO), when the two V-LTRO were held, and zero 
otherwise; in column 2, we introduce a dummy equal to 1 only in 2011Q4 (LTRO-1); in column 
3, the dummy is equal to 1 only in 2012Q1 (LTRO-2). All specifications include the interaction 
                                                                          
15 The ECB´s index is also bounded between 0 and 1, but close to one values signal high financial integration in EMU 
markets (and close to zero values poor integration). To interpret the index as a measure of financial fragmentation, we 
use the following expression: Fragmentation = 1 – x, where x is the value of the ECB´s index. 
16 When we jointly estimate the coefficients of GDP and Fragmentation (not reported), we find that the latter is not statistically 
significant. This could be due to the correlation between the two variables. The Spanish crisis evolved in parallel to the rise 
in fragmentation risks. This makes it very difficult to disentangle the two effects using Spanish data only. 
17 The maturity of the two operations was three years (with an option of early repayment after one year). The interest rate 
was set at the average rate of the main refinancing operations over the life of each liquidity injection. 
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of the corresponding “LTRO” dummy with WEAK. Column 4 further adds the interactions 
between LTRO-2, CBfunding and WEAK. 
The former statistical relationships found in Table 2 still hold: in all regressions, the 
relationship between new central bank funding (CBfunding) and changes in debt holdings 
continues to be significant and positive, and the point estimate is similar to the obtained in 
preceding specifications. On the other hand, the effect of macro conditions (GDP) on debt 
holdings remains large and negative, as expected. 
With regard to the new coefficients, we find that the estimates of the slopes of the 
“LTRO” dummies are always significant and positive except for the specification of column 2 
(LTRO-1). This result is consistent with the idea that banks dealt with each liquidity injection 
differently, and that the “upload” of sovereign portfolios was more substantial during the 
second operation.18 Hence, LTRO-2 is more interesting for our exercise. In this respect, in 
column 3 we find that the estimate of the interaction between LTRO-2 and WEAK is negative 
and significant, which implies that weak banks took less advantage (and, consequently, strong 
banks took more advantage) of the second operation to increase their domestic sovereign 
exposures. This estimate, however, is no longer significant in the extended specification of 
column 4. Besides, in the latter regression we find that the estimates of the coefficients linked 
to the set of interactions between CBfunding, LTRO-2 and WEAK are not statistically different 
from zero. 
We think that these results do not support the moral hazard hypothesis for different 
reasons. To begin with, they show once again that weak institutions did not take the lead in 
exploiting cheap official funding to enlarge sovereign holdings, even when the V-LTRO operations 
were conducted. In a similar vein, it is also noteworthy that the propensity to buy sovereign bonds 
funded through central bank money did not change during the V-LTRO period: according to our 
estimations, the coefficient on CBfunding, which captures this propensity, remained invariant in 
this period (no explanatory power of the interaction between CBfunding and LTRO-2). Besides, 
the estimated coefficient is not statistically different for weak and strong banks (the interaction 
between LTRO-2, CBfunding and WEAK does not explain changes in debt holdings). This latter 
result is important: if moral hazard mechanisms were at play during the V-LTRO period, one 
would expect undercapitalized banks to have increased the proportion of central bank liquidity 
dedicated to buy sovereign debt. This did not happen, though. 
Another interesting conclusion from our results is that the link central bank 
liquidity/LTRO-sovereign holdings cannot be mechanically associated with the emergence of 
carry trade strategies : given that the two V-LTRO were aimed at supporting the adequate 
transmission of monetary policy, i.e. “to maintain the appropriate credit supply to households 
and firms, to ultimately guarantee price stability” (Praet, 2012), the expansion of sovereign 
portfolios against a backdrop of ample official liquidity can be seen as an expected effect of 
monetary policy to alleviate tensions in EMU financial markets, including the sovereign 
segment, and cope with deflationary pressures. This does not rule out the presence of 
opportunistic motivations in the composition of sovereign portfolios, but demonstrates, as 
stated in section 2, that this channel is closely intertwined with monetary policy interventions, 
which should further alleviate moral hazard concerns. 
                                                                          
18 This is aligned with evidence found by Fonseca et al., (2015) for Portuguese banks. The authors argue that banks had 
only two weeks to “prepare” the first V-LTRO in 2011Q4 and, as a result, during this operation many institutions merely 
roll over short-term central bank funding into V-LTRO “funding”. The second operation was conducted at the end of 
2012Q1. At that moment, banks could gather more collateral. As a result, the uptake of the second V-LTRO was 
higher and its allocation to sovereign bonds purchases was also more pronounced. 
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4.3 Distressed institutions and sovereign holdings 
We look further into the moral hazard hypothesis by exploring the behavior of distressed 
banks. We define an institution in distress as a weakly capitalized bank whose productive 
resources (portfolio of loans) have a poor quality. In practical terms, this definition is 
operationalized by defining banks in distress as those with a high level of non-performing 
exposures. Of course, this reflects bad past decisions (i.e.: banks in distress may have granted 
low-quality loans in the past), but might also indicate that the set of investment/lending 
opportunities of the bank has narrowed down (i.e.: their traditional clients have been severely 
impacted by the economic crisis). In this context, these banks may not be able to find new 
solvent borrowers in their market niche. With this in mind, rising sovereign exposures in 
distressed institutions can be seen as the result of two contending forces: 
I. Gambling for resurrection. Distressed banks invest in zero-risk weight, higher-
yielding sovereign debt in a “desperate” attempt to make sufficient profits to avoid 
a default (Acharya and Steffen, 2015). We note that gambling for resurrection is 
similar to moral hazard: when distressed banks buy strained sovereign debt, risk-
shifting from shareholders to creditors could occur. However, it differs from pure 
moral hazard motivations since distressed institutions would view buying 
sovereign debt as (almost) the only highly profitable, non-capital consuming 
investment alternative to bet on their resurrection. 
 
II. Demand-side view. Poor overall (macro) and business (micro) conditions 
completely dominate portfolio strategies of distressed institutions. They gain 
exposure to the sovereign market because few profitable alternatives, if any, 
remain at their disposal (in risk-adjusted terms). There is no bet on sovereign debt, 
but simply a profit maximizing strategy in an environment in which the traditional 
business of distressed banks is no longer profitable. 
 
The next equation aims to identify the behavior of distressed institutions. For this 
purpose, we add time fixed effects to equation (1), which make macro factors and conditions in 
the sovereign market (Price10Y) redundant, and incorporate the new variables related to banks´ 
assets quality. 
Yit = αi + γ୲ + β1WEAKit-1 + β2NPLbankit-1+ β3NPLbankit-1* WEAKit-1 
+	β4CBfundingit + β5CBfundingit * WEAKit-1 ൅ 	ߜXit-1 + ߝit                         (2) 
The dependent variable is again the quarterly percentage change in holdings of 
domestic sovereign debt (Yit), trimmed at 100% QoQ. In the right-hand side of the equation, 
WEAK and CBfunding are the same variables as in equation (1), while NPLbank is the 
difference between the non-performing loans ratio (NPL) of each bank at time t-1 minus the 
average NPL ratio of our sample of banks, also at t-1.19 The specification includes the same 
vector of bank-level controls of the previous equation (Xit-1), as well as bank-fixed effects (αi ) 
and time-fixed effects (γ୲). Standard errors are clustered at the bank level. 
The coefficient of interest now is  β3. Distressed banks are institutions identified by the 
interaction of the WEAK dummy with high NPLbank values.20 If these institutions increase 
                                                                          
19 We cover doubtful loans in Spain on a consolidated basis. 
20 The simpler NPL ratio is also a valid proxy for the quality of the credit portfolio of each bank, but is sensitive to 
downturns in the business cycle: NPL ratios tend to be high when economic conditions deteriorate, even for profitable 
or “good” banks. An additional criterion is thus needed to distinguish between “good” and “bad”, less profitable 
institutions. NPLbank does so by comparing NPL ratios across banks. 
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ceteris paribus their sovereign exposures more than other (non-distressed) institutions, then the 
estimate of  β3 should be positive and significant. 
We show the results for this specification in columns 1 to 3 of Table 4. The estimates 
of β1 and β2 are not statistically significant, which suggests that sovereign portfolios are neither 
affected by the level of capital of banks (no moral hazard) nor by NPLbank when considered in 
isolation. However, the interaction between the two variables has explanatory power: the 
estimation of β3 is statistically significant and positive in column 2, and also in column 3 in 
which we introduce CBfunding and its interaction with WEAK (baseline specification). This 
result confirms the positive statistical link between banks in distress and domestic sovereign 
bond holdings. 
Is this evidence consistent with gambling for resurrection? We cannot assess whether 
distressed banks actively bet on distressed sovereign debt or whether they buy it as a result of 
portfolio constraints, since both alternatives are observationally equivalent in equation (2). This 
is true despite the fact that our regression controls for macro effects that are common to all 
banks in each quarter (through time fixed effects). It could be the case that macro shocks have 
impacted banks differently (at the micro level). For instance, some distressed institutions might 
be operating in geographical areas in which the economic crisis has been more severe. Since 
we do not capture this element in our specification, the door remains open for the demand-
side view narrative. To shed further light, we revisit this discussion using non-domestic 
sovereign exposures in subsection 4.D. 
In addition, we also find that the estimate of β4 is significant and positive (column 3), 
which confirms the explanatory power of the channel linked to the availability of central bank 
funding. Besides, and contrary to specifications in previous sections, the estimate of the 
coefficient associated with the interaction between CBfunding and WEAK (β5) is now significant 
and negative, which would imply that strong (weak) banks benefited more (less) from new 
central bank funding to expand their sovereign portfolios. The last result is, nevertheless, not 
robust to alternative specifications, as we will show immediately. 
4.3.1 DO THESE RESULTS HOLD FOR DIFFERENT CALIBRATIONS OF “WEAK”? 
Hitherto, we have considered a weak bank (WEAK=1) as a bank with capital below the median 
value of the Tier 1 ratio of our set of banks in t-1. However, banks within this group could 
behave in a different manner, i.e. sovereign portfolios of slightly undercapitalized banks do not 
necessarily move in tandem with portfolios of heavily undercapitalized banks as moral 
hazard/gambling for resurrection motivations might be stronger in the second group. To check 
this possibility, we re-estimate equation (2) considering different variations of the variable 
WEAK. In particular, we replace WEAK in each equation with dummies that take the value of 1 
for banks with capital levels in the preceding period below the 40th, 35th, 30th and 25th 
percentile values of the T1 of the system. 
Columns 4 to 7 of Table 4 show the new results for each calibration of WEAK. We find 
further evidence in favor of the relationship distressed institutions-sovereign holdings: the 
estimates of the coefficient associated with the interaction between WEAK and NPLbank are 
highly significant and positive. Once again, regardless of the WEAK measure employed, we do 
not find evidence of moral hazard motivations, as estimations of the WEAK coefficients are all 
far from significant. 
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Lastly, the link between central bank funding and sovereign debt holdings remains 
present. Moreover, we find that this relationship is identical for all institutions, i.e. both for 
undercapitalized and well-capitalized banks (the estimates of the coefficients linked to the 
interaction between CBfunding and the different calibrations of WEAK are not significant), 
which is consistent with the outcome of section 4.B.1. An open question is whether the link 
between central bank liquidity and bond purchases can be entirely attributed to opportunistic 
strategies or if different motivations apply. The next section offers evidence in this respect. 
4.4 Breakdown of sovereign portfolios: holdings of domestic and non-domestic 
sovereign debt 
So far, we have focused on which drivers explain changes in banks´ portfolios exclusively 
formed by domestic sovereign bonds. However, we can extend our analysis by considering 
holdings of debt issued by other governments in EMU to address the issue of home bias. In 
particular, banks´ propensity to hold domestic versus non-domestic sovereign debt could shed 
light on whether moral suasion mechanisms have played a relevant role. Under moral suasion, 
the government would have been able to push banks towards holding more domestic 
sovereign debt (De Marco and Macchiavelli, 2016). At the same time, the analysis of the 
composition of sovereign portfolios should serve us to double check the validity of some of the 
channels we have already examined, and to offer new insights into some of them. Specifically, 
we propose the next equation: 
Yit = αi + β1Fragmentationt-1 + βଶWEAKit-1 ൅ β3Sizeit-1 ൅	β4CROSSit-1 + 	ߜܼ௜௧ିଵ ൅	ߝ௜௧    (3) 
The dependent variable (Yit) is one of the following ratios of bank i in quarter t: 
— Ratio 1 is the ratio of holdings of Spanish government bonds to the entire portfolio 
of sovereign debt; 
— Ratio 2 is the ratio of holdings of Spanish government bonds to holdings of all 
MAC government debt, including Spanish bonds in the denominator. 
— Ratio 3 is the ratio of holdings of Spanish government bonds to a portfolio formed 
by these bonds and LAC government debt. 
— Ratio 4, finally, is the ratio of holdings of MAC government debt, excluding 
Spanish government debt, to holdings of bonds issued by all non-domestic EMU 
governments. 
 
The first three ratios are different home concentration measures.21 Ratio 4 refers to the 
concentration of debt holdings in non-domestic, high-yield (EMU) sovereign securities.22 In the 
right-hand side of the equation, Fragmentation and WEAK are the same variables as before. In 
addition, we have split the vector of (lagged) bank-level controls of equations (1) and (2) into 
three components: Size, which is the natural logarithm of banks´ total assets, CROSS, which is 
banks´ cross-border and domestic exposures to other jurisdictions divided by total assets,23 
and Zit-1, containing the rest of bank-level variables. We do this because we think that Size and 
CROSS might be determinant to explain the composition of cross-border sovereign portfolios. 
The specification further includes bank-fixed effects (αi ), while standard errors are clustered at 
the bank level. 
                                                                          
21 We prefer the term home concentration instead of the term home bias because the latter implies that there is a natural 
or equilibrium level for home sovereign holdings, which we do not estimate. 
22 MAC government debt represents any exposure of banks to liabilities of governments in Italy, Portugal, Greece and 
Ireland. LAC country government debt is any exposure to liabilities of governments in Germany, France, The 
Netherlands, Belgium, Austria and Finland. 
23 We have dropped exposures to the public sector from CROSS to deal with potential endogeneity concerns. 
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The model is suitable for testing different hypothesis, in which we include a novel 
channel, moral suasion: 
I. Impact of financial fragmentation. Financial fragmentation shocks were already 
tested in section 4.B.2 using a different approach, so results reported here can be 
deemed as complementary to the preceding analysis. When financial fragmentation 
in EMU markets augments, banks might prefer domestic sovereign bonds (instead 
of bonds issued by other sovereigns) either because they want to hedge 
redenomination risk or because non-domestic debt does not offer an adequate 
“compensation” given the level of interest rates in domestic versus non-domestic 
jurisdictions. If this hypothesis holds, β1 should be significant and positive whatever 
the home concentration measure considered (Ratio 1, Ratio 2 or Ratio 3). 
 
II. Novel channel: moral suasion. If banks are exhorted by the government to hold 
more domestic debt, home concentration should increase. Moral suasion is likely 
to be more effective for weak institutions since, at the extreme, they might depend 
on government decisions to remain as “going concerns” (Horváth et al., 2015). If 
moral suasion has operated through weak banks, then these institutions should 
tend more to tilt their sovereign portfolios towards domestic bonds (β2 > 0) in 
relation to sovereign debt with similar risk-return characteristics, i.e. debt issued 
by other MAC governments. Hence, the relevant dependent variable to test moral 
suasion is Ratio 2. 
 
III. Moral hazard (risk-shifting) and opportunistic behavior/reach-for-yield. Moral 
hazard exists when weak banks prefer, to a greater extent than other banks, high-
yield sovereign debt over low-yield sovereign debt. In our context, this happens 
when β2 > 0 and the dependent variable is Ratio 3 or Ratio 4. We note that Ratio 
3 is suitable for testing moral hazard provided that the moral suasion hypothesis 
does not hold (otherwise the empirical analysis would be confounded). Both ratios 
will also serve as to explore opportunistic/reach-for-yield behavior, as we will 
clarify now. 
  
4.4.1 RESULTS 
Table 5 summarizes our results for this section. Columns 1 to 3 of Panel A contain the set of 
specifications in which the dependent variable is Ratio 1. Also in Panel A, columns 4 to 6 
present Ratio 2 as the dependent variable. In columns 1 to 3 of Panel B, the dependent 
variable is Ratio 3, while in columns 4 to 6 of this panel the dependent variable is Ratio 4. The 
first column in each set refers to the baseline specification. The second column adds 
CBfunding and time fixed-effects to enhance controls in our regressions, although this comes 
at the cost of making the Fragmentation variable redundant24 (this variable does not vary in the 
cross-section). Finally, the third column incorporates the variable NPLbank and its interaction 
with WEAK to further control for the behavior of “distressed” banks.25 
Financial fragmentation. We find that banks react to fragmentation in EMU markets by 
increasing the share of domestic bonds in their sovereign portfolios: the estimate of β1 is 
                                                                          
24 This variable does not vary in the cross-section. 
25 We drop one bank from the sample because it exclusively invested in home sovereign bonds. A few observations are 
missed for Ratio 3 and 4. In these observations, no debt holdings are reported in the denominator. As a result, it was 
not possible to compute these ratios. 
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positive and largely significant for the three measures of home concentration, Ratio 1, Ratio 2 
and Ratio 3 (columns 1 and 4 of Panel A, and column 1 of Panel B, respectively). 
Moral suasion. No moral suasion mechanisms arise in the regressions: none of the 
estimates of β2 in columns 4 to 6 of Panel A, in which the dependent variable is Ratio 2 (the 
best measure to test moral suasion), is significantly different from zero. This also applies to 
distressed banks, since the interaction between NPLbank and WEAK does not explain home 
concentration either (column 6 of Panel A).26 
Moral hazard and opportunistic motivations/reach-for-yield. We find no signs of risk-
shifting or moral hazard strategies by poorly capitalized banks, and from different angles. In 
columns 1 to 3 of Panel B (in which Ratio 3 is the dependent variable) and in columns 4 to 6 of 
the same panel (Ratio 4), the estimate of β2 (WEAK) is not statistically significant. In columns 3 
and 6 we further study whether the set of distressed banks shows a preference for higher-
yielding sovereign debt, whether domestic or non-domestic. In this respect, estimates of the 
coefficient associated with the interaction between NPLbank and WEAK are not significant at 
the usual confidence bands. This result seems to reject the idea that this set of banks engaged 
in gambling for resurrection strategies (see last section). In any case, these results should be 
taken with caution given that non-domestic debt holdings constitute a minor part of total debt 
holdings of banks. 
Our results also shed light on whether non-moral hazard strategies, particularly reach-
for-yield behavior, have been at play. Reach-for-yield is understood here as in Becker and 
Ivashina (2015), who study preferences of U.S. insurance companies (which, like banks, are 
heavily regulated entities) for holding higher-yielding bonds within the same regulatory risk 
category. Since both MAC and LAC debt form part of the same (regulatory risk) category, 
opportunistic behavior is present if an inclination exists for the former debt type. We study this 
preference in connection with the use of central bank liquidity: if reach-for-yield holds, a 
positive statistical relationship would surge between CB funding (cheap official liquidity) and 
either Ratio 3, which measures home concentration over LAC debt holdings, or Ratio 4, which 
identifies biases towards non-domestic, higher-yielding debt. Ratio 3 is suitable for this test 
because we have ruled out moral suasion. 
According to the outcome of our regressions, the link between central bank liquidity 
and MAC debt holds for Ratio 4 (estimates of the coefficient associated with CBfunding in 
columns 5 and 6 of Panel B are positive and significant) but is absent for Ratio 3 (see same 
estimates for columns 2 and 3 in the same panel). Therefore, reach-for-yield holds but seems 
to be constrained to the non-domestic MAC debt portfolio. This finding is interesting: banks 
cope with domestic and non-domestic debt of similar risk-return characteristics differently. 
Banks´ bets appear to be restricted to non-domestic MAC debt markets. In addition, our 
estimations show that opportunistic strategies are led by well-capitalized institutions: the 
estimate of the coefficient of the intersection between CBfunding and WEAK is significant and 
strongly negative (columns 5 and 6). Therefore, banks with higher risk-bearing capacity are 
those that take on more risk, contrary to what the moral hazard channel predicts. 27  
                                                                          
26 The latter result is interesting when compared to the outcome of the preceding section. Then, we demonstrated that 
distressed banks increase more than other banks holdings of domestic sovereign bonds. Is this a reflection of 
government pressure? Since these banks do not have a preference between buying home over non-home sovereign 
bonds with similar risk-return characteristics, moral suasion does not apply. 
27 This set of results is consistent with evidence for Italian banks in Peydró et al. (2017). 
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Bank-level controls. With regard to bank-level controls, we find that for the first two 
measures of home concentration in Panel A, Ratio 1 (columns 1 to 3) and Ratio 2 (columns 4 
to 6), the estimate of β3 (coefficient of Size) is, apart from the specification in column 1, 
negative and significant. This means that when total assets increase banks tend to hold more 
diversified sovereign portfolios, i.e. less home concentration. In this respect, the estimate of β4 
(coefficient of CROSS) is not statistically significant, which suggests that the size of banks, 
rather than their international exposures, better captures the tendency to home concentration. 
In contrast, CROSS turns out to explain better the changes in the propensity to pile up non-
domestic MAC versus LAC country government debt (in columns 4 to 6 of Panel B, in which Yit 
is Ratio 4, the estimate of β4 or the coefficient of CROSS is always positive, and significant in 
the first two columns), possibly due to the greater presence of some banks in MAC 
jurisdictions. Fragmentation, which is a control in the specification of column 4 of Panel B (Ratio 4), 
plays no role in this relationship (the estimate of β1 is far from significant). 
Overall, these results confirm the findings of previous sections. Importantly, they do 
not support the hypothesis that moral suasion mechanisms have conditioned the composition 
of sovereign portfolios, and further show that the link central bank liquidity-sovereign holdings 
cannot be mechanically associated with opportunistic or reach-for-yield behavior.28 
 
                                                                          
28 As an additional robustness check, we have re-estimate the set of regressions in this section for different calibrations 
of WEAK. Our results broadly hold in the alternative specifications. 
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5 Extensions and further robustness checks 
5.1 Did determinants of sovereign holdings change at the height of the sovereign crisis? 
We assess whether the hypotheses we have identified so far changed at the height of the 
sovereign crisis. We check this because our sample covers a large time-span (36 quarters), which 
might mask temporary statistical relationships in the data, potentially more evident when sovereign 
strains were more pronounced. To explore this possibility, we propose the next equation: 
Yit = αi + β1WEAKit-1	+ β2PRICE௧௬	+ β3PRICE௧௬	* 	WEAKit-1 
+ β4CBfundingit + β5CBfundingit * WEAKit-1 + β6GDPt-1		+ ω1crisis +	ω2crisis * WEAKit-1	 
+	ω3crisis * PRICE௧௬ +	ω4crisis * PRICE௧௬ * WEAKit-1	 
+	ω5crisis * CBfundingit +	ω6crisis * CBfundingit* WEAKit-1  +	ߜXit-1 + ߝit                             (4) 
The specification is basically an extension of equation (1). The variable PRICE is 
exactly the same as before, namely the contemporaneous quarterly price change in 
government debt, but now we will show results for the 10 year and the 5 year on the run 
benchmarks, represented by the superscript y. We cover the same time period/set of banks 
while adding a variable, crisis, which is a dummy equal to 1 from 2010Q2 to 2012Q3 and zero 
otherwise, and some interactions between the new dummy and other variables.29 The starting 
point of the crisis dummy, 2010Q2, coincides with the first bail out of Greece, which put the 
MAC sovereign segment in the spotlight. The final point (2012Q3) refers to the announcement 
of the Outright Monetary Transactions programme, which marked a turning point in the EMU 
sovereign crisis. This period is definitively special: not only due to the existing tensions in the 
sovereign market, but also because of the appeal of risk-shifting strategies over these two 
years. At the height of the sovereign crisis, 1) sovereign spreads on Spanish government debt 
rocketed; 2) banks could readily access central bank funding, including funding from the two 
ad hoc V-LTRO (see also section 4.B.3); (3) in parallel, as a result of the severe economic crisis, 
the solvency of some institutions was eroded, making the transfer of risks from banks´ 
shareholders to creditors more likely. 
Table 6 shows the results for the estimations of equation (4). 
As expected, banks´ capital does not condition bond purchases, neither in “normal” 
times (estimates of β1 are not statistically significant) nor during the crisis period (estimates of 
ω2 are not significantly different from zero). Central bank funding and macro conditions are 
once more major drivers of sovereign holdings: the estimates of β4 (CBfunding) and β6 (GDP) 
are significant in all specifications, and their signs are the expected ones. Interestingly, the 
amount of central bank liquidity dedicated to buy sovereign bonds did not change during the 
crisis (estimates of ω5 and ω6 are not significant). 
Furthermore, the advent of the crisis did not per se move banks to increase their 
holdings of sovereign bonds (estimates of ω1 are not statistically significant), but their 
investment behavior somewhat shifted. In particular, we find that banks adopted contrarian 
strategies in the domestic sovereign market during the crisis period, buying debt when bond 
prices were falling, and selling it when prices were increasing/recovering (the estimate of ω3 is 
                                                                          
29 These specifications include the same vector of bank-level controls and bank-fixed effects of equation (1). Errors are 
again clustered at the bank level. 
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negative and significant in column 4, in which PRICE reflects price changes in the 5 year 
benchmark bond).30 This was not the only driver of sovereign bond purchases: central bank 
liquidity and macro effects still retained a major role in this period. However, the countercyclical 
role played by banks over a sovereign stress episode offers interesting insights. Specifically, it 
shows that the interconnectedness between banks and the sovereign might provide financial 
stability dividends in a crisis context.31 
Is the preceding evidence consistent with the execution of moral hazard strategies? 
We have argued that for the risk-shifting hypothesis to hold poorly capitalized banks should 
take more advantage of opportunistic strategies than their peers (see section 4.B). In this 
respect, the estimate of the coefficient associated with the interaction between PRICE, T1 and 
crisis (ω4) is not significant at the relevant confidence levels. This supports the idea that weak 
banks did not embrace risk-shifting strategies, even during the sovereign stress episode. 
5.2 Alternative proxies for solvency and results 
As an additional robustness check, we re-estimate results of equations (1) and (2) considering 
different proxies for measuring the solvency position of banks. In particular, we replace the Tier 
1 ratio of banks with three alternative measures: 
— Own funds ratio, which covers all instruments included in the numerator of the Tier 
1 and further adds Tier 2 items, divided by risk-weighted assets (RWA). 
— Leverage_1, defined as the ratio of total assets to all Tier 1 instruments. 
— Leverage_2, or the ratio of total assets to own funds. 
 
For each measure, we recalibrate the WEAK dummy accordingly.32  
Table 7 shows the results. Columns 1 to 3 show specifications of equation (1) with the 
new solvency measures. Columns 4 to 6 do the same for equation (2). These new results 
confirm once more the importance of macro-financial conditions and central bank liquidity as 
drivers of sovereign portfolios: gloomy economic conditions (drop in GDP) translate into an 
increase in sovereign holdings, while an upsurge in central bank funding (CBfunding) leads to 
higher debt holdings, too. On the contrary, evidence in favor of the moral hazard hypothesis is 
absent: the estimates of the coefficient linked to WEAK are far from significant in all 
regressions. Moreover, this set of specifications reveals that less capitalized institutions took 
little advantage of central bank funding to expand their sovereign portfolios (this relationship 
was less clear using the T1 as a proxy for solvency), which further rules out the moral hazard 
proposition. In addition, the specification of column 4 confirms that banks in distress invested 
more in the sovereign market: the estimate of the coefficient of the interaction between 
NPLbank and WEAK is positive and significant. This result, however, does not hold for 
Leverage_1 and Leverage_2, which might simply capture that risk-weighted capital measures 
do a better job at identifying distressed institutions when interacted with NPL ratios. 
 
                                                                          
30 In column 3 (price changes in the 10 year benchmark security), the sign of this coefficient is also negative, but the estimate 
is not significant at the 10% confidence level. The negative relationship between prices and sovereign holdings goes 
against the hypothesis that banks generally respond in a pro-cyclical manner to price changes (Timmer, 2018). 
31 Support of banks to distressed sectors seems to be not limited to the public sector. Giannetti and Saidi (2017), for 
instance, show that banks have a higher propensity to lend to industries in distress to which they hold large exposures. 
32 For instance, for the own funds ratio, WEAK is equal to 1 if, instead of the Tier 1, the (lagged) own funds ratio of bank i 
falls below the median of the system in t-1; we follow a similar calibration for the rest of solvency measures. 
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5.3 What if being a weak bank was the norm? 
All through the empirical analysis we have worked on the assumption that weak banks are 
banks with low capital levels when compared to the median values of the system. However, if 
the sample of banks is dominated by weak banks, our identification strategy would be flawed. 
While we do not believe that this is the case, we propose hereafter an alternative specification 
to deal with this issue. 
In the next equation, we omit the step relative to the identification of weak banks (i.e. 
we drop WEAK) and directly test the moral hazard channel by linking changes in sovereign 
holdings with the Tier 1 ratio of banks, which was previously a bank-level control. An important 
drawback of this approach is that we treat any change in the Tier 1 ratio in the same way, no 
matter whether the absolute solvency position of the bank is strong (high level of Tier 1 capital) 
or weak (low level): 
Yit = αi + β1Fragmentationit-1 ൅ βଶT1it-1 ൅	β3Sizeit-1 ൅	β4CROSSit-1  
+ β5CBfundingit + β6CBfundingit * T1it-1 ൅ ߜVit-1 + ߝit                               (5) 
The dependent variable (Yit) is one of the following: (i) quarterly changes in holdings of 
domestic sovereign debt (in percentage), trimmed at 100% QoQ; (ii) Ratio 1; (iii) Ratio 2; (iv) 
Ratio 3; and (v) Ratio 4 as defined in section 4.D. Fragmentation (the common macro control 
for all specifications), CBfunding, Size and CROSS are known variables. The Tier 1 capital ratio 
(T1 for short) is included as an explanatory variable separated from the vector of bank-level 
controls (Vit-1). The equation incorporates bank-fixed effects (αi ) and standard errors are again 
clustered at the bank level. Table 8 shows the results for this specification, which is aligned 
with earlier evidence. 
As expected, an increase in Fragmentation is associated with higher domestic bond 
holdings and stronger home concentration: the estimate of βଵ is positive and largely significant 
in specifications of columns 1 to 4. In contrast, the level of banks´ capital, T1, plays no role in 
explaining changes in sovereign debt holdings, nor leads banks to hold more domestic bonds 
or higher-yielding sovereign debt in detriment of other sovereign securities (the estimate of βଶ is 
not statistically significant across all specifications). 
According to estimates in column 1, banks tend to increase their domestic  sovereign 
debt holdings when they draw funds from the central bank (the estimate of β5 is positive and 
statistically significant), in line with previous findings. This tendency seems to increase when 
banks´ capital augment (the estimate of β6 is also positive and significant in this column), which 
suggests that when banks count on a more ample capital cushion, they are more willing to gain 
exposure to the domestic sovereign market. It is not clear that this is driven by reach-for-yield 
strategies: central bank funding does not lead to higher holdings of higher-yielding sovereign 
debt, either domestic or foreign (see estimates of the same coefficients in columns 3 and 4). 
Contrary to the outcome of section 4.D.1, this finding also applies to well-capitalized 
institutions. 
5.4 New aggregation strategy: composition of banking groups for each date 
In our regressions, we aggregate information from individual banks according to the set-up of 
banking groups existing as of the end of 2016. The main advantage of this approach is that it is 
insensitive to mergers and acquisitions activity, which has been intense in recent years. This, in 
turn, allows us to construct smoother long time series for each bank. A drawback of this 
strategy is that it results in lower bank heterogeneity, which might bias our results. In particular, 
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weak banks could have been those absorbed by solvent institutions. If this is the case, we 
would be erroneously treating these banks as well-capitalized. 
To control for biases derived from the consolidation of banks as of 2016Q4, we now 
employ a new dataset in which we consider the original composition of banks at each date. 
This increases significantly the number of banks in the sample (37 institutions). Of course, this 
comes at the cost of several discontinuities in our time series, and a panel that becomes more 
unbalanced, as many institutions ceased to exist during the crisis.33 
Table 9 shows regressions results using the new dataset. In columns 1 to 4, the 
dependent variable is again the quarterly growth of domestic sovereign debt (trimmed at 100% 
QoQ). In columns 5 to 8, we analyze home bias and the propensity to hold non-domestic MAC 
debt over LAC debt (in this set of regressions, the sample of banks collapses to only 23 
institutions as many of them invest exclusively in domestic debt markets). Compared to the 
previous regressions, the connection between central bank liquidity and sovereign holdings is 
weaker for the set of poorly capitalized banks. The estimate of the coefficient associated with 
the interaction between NPLbank and WEAK is less significant, too. But apart from these 
results, the outcome of this set of regressions is broadly consistent with prior findings. In 
particular, the effect of financial fragmentation is strong across all specifications. On the other 
hand, no results in the new regressions validate the moral hazard behavior. 
 
                                                                          
33 The dataset includes all significant institutions as well as banks that ended up being part of them. We have also 
included other small banks to improve the coverage of our dataset. 
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6 Conclusions 
In this paper, we study the determinants of sovereign debt holdings of Spanish banks over a 
long time-span, covering the worst part of the sovereign crisis. Spain is a perfect “laboratory” 
for this exercise: banks had to manage their sovereign portfolios under strong profitability 
pressures, resulting from a deteriorated macro scenario that followed the real estate crisis and 
turmoil in the domestic sovereign market. On top of that, non-conventional support from the 
Eurosystem (e.g. low repo rates, full allotment, large-scale liquidity injections) incorporates an 
interesting dimension to our setting. 
Our analysis yields several interesting results. First, we do not find evidence of moral 
hazard, since weakly capitalized banks were not associated with higher (distressed) sovereign 
holdings. Undercapitalized banks did not take advantage of depressed market conditions (low 
prices in sovereign debt) to gain exposure to this market segment, either. Besides, we do not find 
evidence supporting the view that weaker banks were persuaded to hold domestic sovereign debt 
in detriment of other sovereign securities or even credit to the private sector (no moral suasion). 
Second, the link between central bank liquidity and holdings of sovereign debt is 
positive and strong. This might give the impression that banks engaged in carry trade/reach-
for-yield strategies. We see this narrative as incomplete. Without neglecting the possibility that 
opportunistic motivations played a role, we show that the upload of sovereign holdings is 
associated with exogenous monetary policy interventions like V-LTRO liquidity injections. 
Moreover, when we compare the propensity to hold higher-yielding versus lower-yielding 
sovereign debt, we fail to find a clear preference for the former debt type. While reach-for-yield 
could have operated in non-domestic MAC debt portfolios, evidence is far from conclusive and, 
importantly, limited to the group of more strongly capitalized and larger institutions. These 
institutions should have a higher risk-bearing capacity. In addition, some of them have a 
stronger presence in foreign markets, which may explain this strategy in the context of their 
operations in host countries.  
Finally, we show that macro conditions play an important role in sovereign holdings. In 
this same vein, we find that financial fragmentation in EMU markets (a measure of price dispersion 
across countries of in theory very similar assets) was a strong driver of home concentration  
(i.e. propensity to hold domestic bonds instead of non-domestic debt in sovereign portfolios). We 
think that this supports the hypothesis that banks re-nationalized sovereign portfolios at the height 
of the sovereign crisis as a means of hedging against an EMU-break up. Furthermore, since 
financial fragmentation still remains a concern in EMU (although less acute than during the 
sovereign crisis), its effects are likely to reach sovereign portfolios today.  
Our research has important policy implications. The Basel Committee on Banking 
supervision has recently published a discussion paper for a potential revision of the current 
treatment of sovereign exposures, which currently assigns a zero risk weight to domestic 
exposures (BCBS, 2018). In this sense, the counter-cyclical role that banks appeared to play at 
the height of the crisis (buying debt at times of stress) adds an interesting perspective to the 
discussion on the so-called nexus between sovereign risk and bank credit risk. Some 
commentators believe that large sovereign exposures strengthen the loop. However, the 
evidence from this paper shows that support from banks could stabilize sovereign markets at 
critical moments.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A shows characteristics of our set of banks, i.e. the fourteen significant 
institutions identified in Spain as of the end of 2016Q4, including their sovereign portfolios. All 
data in Panel A are obtained on a consolidated basis. Home bonds refer to holdings of 
domestic sovereign debt. Non-domestic MAC bonds refer to exposures to liabilities of a set of 
EMU more affected by the crisis governments, excluding the Spanish public sector (domestic 
market): Italy, Portugal, Greece and Ireland. LAC country bonds represent exposures to 
liabilities of a set of EMU less affected by the crisis governments: Germany, France, The 
Netherlands, Belgium, Austria and Finland. Cross_claims are international exposures divided by 
total assets and include not only international claims (cross-border claims or domestic claims in 
foreign currency), but also domestic claims in domestic currency. Use of derivatives refers to 
the weight of trading derivatives registered in the assets side of banks´ balance sheets. Central 
bank funding is adjusted for assets (deposits) against the central bank. The NPL ratio is the 
ratio of non-performing loans to total loans.  
In Panel B, Domestic sovereign debt, price changes (QoQ, %) refer to the quarterly 
price changes in the 10 year on the run Spanish government bond. GDP growth, YoY (%) is 
the yearly percentage change in GDP. Finally, Fragmentation index is derived from an index 
developed by ECB staff (2018) and bounded between 0 and 1. It measures financial 
fragmentation in EMU markets. 
 
 
Panel A. Bank-level variables
mean sd p25 p75
Holdings of domestic sovereign debt  (% of total assets) 9.6 8.0 5.4 10.9
   growth rate, QoQ (%) 6.2 36.2 -5.9 10.9
Home bonds / Total sovereign bonds, % 89.6 11.8 83.4 98.3
Home bonds / (Home bonds and non-local MAC bonds), % 92.6 9.9 89.9 99.5
Home bonds / (Home bonds and LAC bonds), % 96.2 6.9 94.4 100.0
Non-local MAC bonds / (Non-local MAC and LAC bonds), % 71.3 33.7 48.0 100.0
Assets (EUR billion) 237.0 319.0 57.2 310.0
Cross_claims (% of total assets) 13.5 19.1 2.5 11.3
Interbank funding (% of total assets) 6.6 3.2 3.9 9.1
Deposit funding (% of total assets) 58.8 11.4 48.6 69.1
Use of derivatives (% of total assets) 0.018 0.026 0.001 0.020
Bond funding (% of total assets) 12.1 7.4 6.5 17.0
Central bank funding (% of total assets) 5.1 5.3 1.6 8.1
   quarterly var iation (% of total assets) 0.1 2.0 -0.7 0.9
Tier 1 capital ratio (% of r isk-weighted assets) 10.3 2.1 8.9 11.7
NPL ratio (% of total loans; only loans in Spain) 8.9 5.2 4.9 12.0
Panel B. Macro-financial variables
mean sd p25 p75
Domestic sovereign debt, price changes (QoQ, %) 0.6 4.3 -1.3 3.5
GDP growth (YoY, %) 0.0 2.5 -2.2 2.5
Fragmentation index 0.6 0.1 0.5 0.7
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Table 2. Moral hazard versus alternative channels 
 
The table studies the determinants of holdings of domestic sovereign bonds. Our 
sample consists of the fourteen significant banks identified in Spain as of the end of 2016Q4. 
We cover the period from 2008Q1 to 2016Q4 on a quarterly basis. The dependent variable is 
the quarterly percentage change in holdings of domestic sovereign bonds of each bank 
(holdings trimmed at 100% QoQ to avoid outliers). WEAK is a dummy equal to one when a 
bank has, in the preceding quarter, a Tier 1 capital ratio (T1) below the median value of the T1 
of our sample of banks, and it is zero otherwise. PRICE10Y is the quarterly percentage change 
in the price of the 10 year on the run Spanish government bond. CBfunding is the quarterly 
variation of funding from the central bank (adjusted for assets against this institution) divided by 
total assets. GDP is the lagged yearly percentage change in GDP. Fragmentation is the first lag 
of a financial fragmentation measure derived from an index for EMU markets developed by the 
ECB (the index is bounded between zero and one; when close to one, financial fragmentation 
rises). The specification incorporates a vector of (lagged) bank-level variables to control for 
characteristics of banks, including size (natural logarithm of total assets), international activity 
(exposures to other jurisdictions over total assets) and complexity (use of derivatives and the 
structure of liabilities of each institution- deposit, interbank, bond and the stock of central bank 
funding-, divided by total assets). Estimates of coefficients of bank-level controls are omitted in 
the table. At this respect, the estimate of the coefficient of Bond funding is statistically 
significant and positive in columns 1 (**) and 2 (*). No other estimates are statistically different 
from zero. The specification includes bank-fixed effects.  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
WEAK -15.68 -19.29 -15.02 -18.88
(22.65) (21.28) (20.08) (20.39)
PRICE10Y -0.200 -0.227 -0.191
(0.575) (0.557) (0.561)
PRICE10Y x WEAK 0.257 0.260 0.246
(0.526) (0.522) (0.524)
CBfunding 3.387*** 3.299*** 3.277***
(0.593) (0.609) (0.603)
CBfunding x WEAK -1.692 -1.682 -1.701
(1.199) (1.233) (1.213)
GDP -1.228***
(0.398)
Fragmentation 14.12**
(5.323)
Observations 500 500 500 500
Bank controls Y Y Y Y
Bank fixed effects Y Y Y Y
Time fixed effects N N N N
Number of banks 14 14 14 14
Overall R^2 0.028 0.041 0.035 0.035
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses and are clustered at the 
bank level: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 3. Upsurge of sovereign exposures during the V-LTRO period and drivers 
 
The table studies the determinants of holdings of domestic sovereign bonds during 
the period in which the Eurosystem conducted the first two very long-term refinancing 
operations (V-LTRO), in 2011Q4 and 2012Q1. Our sample consists of the fourteen significant 
banks identified in Spain as of the end of 2016Q4. We cover the period from 2008Q1 to 
2016Q4 on a quarterly basis. The dependent variable is the quarterly percentage change in 
holdings of domestic sovereign bonds of each bank (holdings trimmed at 100% QoQ to avoid 
outliers). WEAK is a dummy equal to one when a bank has, in the preceding quarter, a Tier 1 
capital ratio (T1) below the median value of the T1 of our sample of banks, and it is zero 
otherwise. PRICE10Y is the quarterly percentage change in the price of the 10 year on the run 
Spanish government bond. CBfunding is the quarterly variation of funding from the central bank 
(adjusted for assets against this institution) divided by total assets. GDP is the lagged yearly 
percentage change in GDP. LTRO is a dummy equal to 1 in 2011Q4 and 2012Q1 (LTRO); 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
WEAK -14.60 -15.39 -14.97 -15.41
(20.11) (20.47) (19.88) (20.07)
PRICE10Y -0.243 -0.219 -0.213 -0.210
(0.563) (0.562) (0.550) (0.550)
PRICE10Y x WEAK 0.270 0.246 0.262 0.261
(0.525) (0.529) (0.512) (0.516)
CBfunding 2.536** 3.399*** 2.310** 2.372***
(0.927) (0.738) (0.781) (0.772)
CBfunding x WEAK -1.101 -1.871 -0.803 -0.823
(1.638) (1.319) (1.507) (1.582)
GDP -1.119** -1.227*** -1.128** -1.118**
(0.407) (0.393) (0.423) (0.422)
LTRO 13.55*
(6.889)
LTRO x WEAK -8.978
(8.905)
LTRO-1 -4.341
(8.751)
LTRO-1 x WEAK 8.340
(11.09)
LTRO-2 28.15*** 36.87**
(5.772) (14.77)
LTRO-2 x WEAK -24.30* -29.88
(11.46) (23.10)
LTRO-2 x CBfunding -1.880
(3.205)
LTRO-2 x CBfunding x WEAK 0.901
(5.731)
Observations 500 500 500 500
Bank controls Y Y Y Y
Bank fixed effects Y Y Y Y
Time fixed effects N N N N
Number of banks 14 14 14 14
Overall R^2 0.036 0.036 0.041 0.040
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses and are clustered at the 
bank level: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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LTRO-1 is a dummy equal to 1 only in 2011Q4; LTRO-2 is a dummy equal to 1 only in 2012Q1 
(LTRO-2). The specification incorporates a vector of (lagged) bank-level variables to control for 
characteristics of banks, including size (natural logarithm of total assets), international activity 
(exposures to other jurisdictions over total assets) and complexity (use of derivatives and the 
structure of liabilities of each institution- deposit, interbank, bond and the stock of central bank 
funding-, divided by total assets). Estimates of coefficients of bank-level controls are omitted in 
the table. At this respect, the estimate of the coefficient of Bond funding is statistically 
significant and positive in column 2 (*). No other estimates are statistically different from zero. 
The specification includes bank-fixed effects. 
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Table 4. Distressed institutions and sovereign holdings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The table explores drivers behind the composition of sovereign portfolios of distressed 
banks. Our sample consists of the fourteen significant banks identified in Spain as of the end of 
2016Q4. We cover the period from 2008Q1 to 2016Q4 on a quarterly basis. The dependent 
variable is the quarterly percentage change in holdings of domestic sovereign bonds of each 
bank (holdings trimmed at 100% QoQ to avoid outliers). WEAK is a dummy equal to one when 
a bank has, in the preceding quarter, a Tier 1 capital ratio (T1) below the median value of the 
T1 of our sample of banks, and it is zero otherwise. WEAK40, WEAK35, WEAK30 and 
WEAK25, in turn, identify banks with T1 below 40th, 35th, 30th and 25th percentile values in 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
WEAK -11.93 -11.06 -10.29
(24.99) (24.68) (23.43)
NPLbank -0.102 -0.313 -0.441 -0.389 -0.501 -0.500 -0.320
(0.480) (0.405) (0.384) (0.364) (0.420) (0.420) (0.383)
NPLbank x WEAK 0.466* 0.538**
(0.244) (0.215)
CBfunding 2.334*** 1.535** 1.599** 1.597** 1.546
(0.692) (0.617) (0.669) (0.674) (0.910)
CBfunding x WEAK -1.900*
(1.013)
WEAK40 -12.50
(13.08)
NPLbank x WEAK40 0.728*
(0.338)
CBfunding x WEAK40 -0.587
(1.276)
WEAK35 -5.628
(12.04)
NPLbank x WEAK35 1.352***
(0.374)
CBfunding x WEAK35 -0.930
(1.011)
WEAK30 -6.255
(12.19)
NPLbank x WEAK30 1.353***
(0.374)
CBfunding x WEAK30 -0.920
(1.017)
WEAK25 -7.216
(9.431)
NPLbank x WEAK25 0.989**
(0.386)
CBfunding x WEAK25 -1.188
(1.191)
Observations 500 500 500 500 500 500 500
Bank controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Bank fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Number of banks 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
Overall R^2 0.167 0.170 0.148 0.176 0.189 0.189 0.185
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses and are clustered at the bank level: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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the preceding quarter. NPLbank is the lagged difference between the non-performing loans 
ratio (NPL) of each bank (considering only its business activities in Spain) minus the average 
NPL of the whole banking system at time t-1. CBfunding is the quarterly variation of funding 
from the central bank (adjusted for assets against this institution) divided by total assets. The 
specification incorporates a vector of (lagged) bank-level variables to control for characteristics 
of banks, including size (natural logarithm of total assets), international activity (exposures to 
other jurisdictions over total assets) and complexity (use of derivatives and the structure of 
liabilities of each institution- deposit, interbank, bond and the stock of central bank funding-, 
divided by total assets). Estimates of coefficients of bank-level controls are omitted in the table 
and they are not statistically different from zero. The specification includes bank-fixed effects 
and time-fixed effects. 
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Table 5. Breakdown of sovereign portfolios: domestic and non-domestic sovereign debt 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A. Tests for financial fragmentation and moral suasion channels
Dependent variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fragmentation 29.65*** 23.29**
(8.994) (8.673)
WEAK -12.42 -7.916 -8.089 -13.62 -9.770 -10.02
(10.82) (10.92) (10.39) (9.903) (10.34) (9.751)
Size -13.07 -15.13* -15.02* -14.59** -15.66** -15.55**
(7.960) (7.431) (7.091) (6.271) (6.665) (6.312)
CROSS -0.425 -0.289 -0.330 -0.440 -0.365 -0.404
(0.451) (0.472) (0.507) (0.418) (0.435) (0.462)
CBfunding -0.182 -0.155 -0.337 -0.314
(0.218) (0.223) (0.237) (0.234)
CBfunding x WEAK -0.271 -0.301 -0.199 -0.227
(0.277) (0.269) (0.298) (0.285)
NPLbank -0.272 -0.230
(0.408) (0.372)
NPLbank x WEAK -0.0532 -0.105
(0.392) (0.422)
Observations 464 464 464 464 464 464
Bank controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Bank fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time fixed effects N Y Y N Y Y
Number of banks 13 13 13 13 13 13
Overall R^2 0.314 0.323 0.327 0.248 0.270 0.272
Panel B. Tests for financial fragmentation, moral hazard and reach-for-yield channels
Dependent variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fragmentation 10.27** 7.210
(3.722) (22.84)
WEAK 1.768 2.399 2.511 -14.10 -15.13 -13.61
(4.357) (4.723) (4.725) (32.98) (31.10) (30.18)
Size 2.824 1.049 1.060 -13.87 -18.79 -18.38
(5.307) (4.171) (4.192) (27.21) (29.38) (29.10)
CROSS 0.006 0.085 0.0909 1.103* 1.184* 1.108
(0.162) (0.140) (0.152) (0.605) (0.652) (0.673)
CBfunding 0.179 0.178 1.547* 1.654**
(0.108) (0.108) (0.732) (0.702)
CBfunding x WEAK -0.132 -0.128 -1.777* -1.848*
(0.080) (0.0877) (0.926) (0.962)
NPLbank 0.015 -1.040
(0.115) (1.635)
NPLbank x WEAK 0.062 1.067
(0.133) (1.449)
Observations 461 461 461 459 459 459
Bank controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Bank fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time fixed effects N Y Y N Y Y
Number of banks 13 13 13 13 13 13
Overall R^2 0.267 0.300 0.295 0.360 0.360 0.358
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses and are clustered at the bank level: 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Ratio 4: Non-local MAC bonds            
to all non-local bonds
Ratio 3: Home bonds to                 
(home bonds + LAC bonds) 
Ratio1: Home bonds to total bonds        
Ratio 2: Home bonds to                 
(home bonds + non-local MAC bonds)
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This table studies the preference of banks for domestic sovereign bonds and higher-
yielding EMU sovereign debt. The dependent variables are: in panel A, “Ratio 1” or the ratio of 
holdings of Spanish government bonds to the entire portfolio of sovereign debt, and “Ratio 2” 
or the ratio of holdings of Spanish government bonds to holdings of MAC government debt, 
including Spanish bonds in the denominator; in panel B, “Ratio 3” or the ratio of holdings of 
Spanish government bonds to a portfolio formed by these bonds and LAC government debt, 
and “Ratio 4” or the ratio of holdings of MAC government debt, excluding Spanish government 
debt, to holdings of bonds issued by all non-domestic EMU governments. Fragmentation is the 
first lag of a financial fragmentation measure derived from an index for EMU markets developed 
by the ECB (the index is bounded between zero and one; when close to one, financial 
fragmentation rises). Size is total assets of each bank (we take the natural logarithm) and 
Cross_claims are banks´ exposures to other jurisdictions divided by total assets. WEAK is a 
dummy equal to one when a bank has, in the preceding quarter, a Tier 1 capital ratio (T1) 
below the median value of the T1 of our sample of banks, and it is zero otherwise. NPLbank is 
the lagged difference between the non-performing loans ratio (NPL) of each bank (considering 
only its business activities in Spain) minus the average NPL of the whole banking system at time t-
1. The specification incorporates a vector of (lagged) bank-level variables to control for complexity 
(use of derivatives and the structure of liabilities of each institution- deposit, interbank, bond and 
the stock of central bank funding-, divided by total assets). At this respect, the estimate of the 
coefficient of Bond funding is statistically significant and negative in columns 1 to 3 of Panel B (**). 
No other estimates are statistically different from zero. The specifications include bank-fixed 
effects in all columns and time-fixed effects in columns 2, 3, 5 and 6 of each panel. 
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Table 6. Determinants of sovereign holdings at the height of the sovereign crisis 
 
This table tests whether determinants of holdings of domestic sovereign bonds 
changed at the height of the sovereign crisis. Our sample consists of the fourteen significant 
banks identified in Spain as of the end of 2016Q4. We cover the period from 2008Q1 to 
2016Q4 on a quarterly basis. The dependent variable is the quarterly percentage change in 
holdings of domestic sovereign bonds of each bank (holdings trimmed at 100% QoQ to avoid 
outliers). WEAK is a dummy equal to one when a bank has, in the preceding quarter, a Tier 1 
capital ratio (T1) below the median value of the T1 of our sample of banks, and it is zero 
otherwise. PRICE10Y and PRICE5Y are, respectively, the quarterly percentage change in the 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
WEAK -15.09 -13.72 -13.04 -13.85
(20.01) (20.81) (20.34) (20.73)
PRICE10Y -0.187 -0.136 0.445
(0.534) (0.481) (0.434)
PRICE10Y x WEAK 0.252 0.149 -0.127
(0.519) (0.465) (0.659)
CBfunding 3.265*** 3.205*** 2.717* 2.651*
(0.644) (0.642) (1.383) (1.321)
CBfunding x WEAK -1.694 -1.566 0.130 0.144
(1.225) (1.313) (2.485) (2.431)
GDP -1.218** -1.222** -1.229** -1.192**
(0.405) (0.407) (0.421) (0.426)
crisis 1.308 3.155 2.080 2.509
(1.995) (3.907) (3.516) (3.575)
crisis x WEAK -3.688 -1.894 -1.242
(5.875) (5.397) (5.516)
crisis x PRICE10Y -1.487
(0.901)
crisis x WEAK x PRICE10Y 0.401
(1.523)
crisis x CBfunding 1.287 1.415
(2.099) (2.030)
crisis x CBfunding x WEAK -4.085 -4.189
(3.178) (3.113)
PRICE5Y 0.618
(0.567)
PRICE5Y x WEAK 0.559
(0.765)
crisis x PRICE5Y -2.010*
(1.025)
crisis x WEAK x PRICE5Y -0.289
(1.793)
Observations 500 500 500 500
Bank controls Y Y Y Y
Bank fixed effects Y Y Y Y
Time fixed effects N N N N
Number of banks 14 14 14 14
Overall R^2 0.033 0.031 0.040 0.042
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses and are clustered at the bank
level: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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price of the 10 year and the price of the 5 year Spanish government benchmarks. CBfunding is 
the quarterly variation of funding from the central bank (adjusted for assets against this 
institution) divided by total assets. GDP is the lagged yearly percentage change in GDP. crisis is 
a dummy equal to 1 from 2010Q2 to 2012Q3 and zero otherwise. The specification 
incorporates a vector of (lagged) bank-level variables to control for characteristics of banks, 
including size (natural logarithm of total assets), international activity (exposures to other 
jurisdictions over total assets) and complexity (use of derivatives and the structure of liabilities of 
each institution- deposit, interbank, bond and the stock of central bank funding-, divided by 
total assets). Estimates of coefficients of bank-level controls are omitted in the table and they 
are not statistically significant. The specification includes bank-fixed effects.  
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Proxy for solvency Own funds Leverage_1 Leverage_2 Own funds Leverage_1 Leverage_2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
WEAK 4.332 8.361 7.561 8.264 6.036 7.970
(8.329) (14.65) (10.81) (9.404) (16.88) (12.53)
PRICE10Y -0.517 -0.686 -0.536
(0.528) (0.681) (0.577)
PRICE10Y x WEAK 0.828 1.103 0.797
(0.475) (0.716) (0.487)
CBfunding 3.393*** 3.621*** 4.115*** 2.242*** 2.927** 3.260**
(0.539) (0.956) (1.053) (0.718) (1.114) (1.138)
CBfunding x WEAK -1.923* -2.505* -3.201** -1.884* -3.223** -3.557**
(0.916) (1.210) (1.381) (0.970) (1.383) (1.419)
GDP -1.401*** -1.366** -1.547***
(0.416) (0.457) (0.494)
NPLbank -0.493 -0.0816 -0.416
(0.526) (0.594) (0.506)
NPLbank x WEAK 0.544* -0.445 0.150
(0.261) (0.421) (0.363)
Observations 500 500 500 500 500 500
Bank controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Bank fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time fixed effects N N N Y Y Y
Number of banks 14 14 14 14 14 14
Overall R^2 0.039 0.039 0.052 0.140 0.132 0.172
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses and are clustered at the bank level: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Equation (1) Equation (2)
Table 7. Alternatives proxies for solvency and results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This table tests whether our results hold for alternative measures to the Tier 1 capital 
ratio (T1). Our sample consists of the fourteen significant banks identified in Spain as of the end of 
2016Q4. We cover the period from 2008Q1 to 2016Q4 on a quarterly basis. The dependent 
variable is the quarterly percentage change in holdings of domestic sovereign bonds of each bank 
(holdings trimmed at 100% QoQ to avoid outliers). WEAK is a dummy equal to one when a bank 
has, in the preceding quarter, a level of solvency below the system-wide median value of the 
following list of solvency measures: (i) the own funds ratio, which adds Tier 2 items to the 
numerator of the T1; (i) Leverage_1, or the ratio of total assets to all T1 instruments; and (3) 
Leverage_2, or the ratio of total assets to own funds. PRICE10Y is the quarterly percentage 
change in the price of the 10 year on the run Spanish government bond. CBfunding is the 
quarterly variation of funding from the central bank (adjusted for assets against this institution) 
divided by total assets. GDP is the lagged yearly percentage change in GDP. NPLbank is the 
lagged difference between the non-performing loans ratio (NPL) of each bank (considering only its 
business activities in Spain) minus the average NPL of the whole banking system at time t-1. The 
specification incorporates a vector of (lagged) bank-level variables to control for characteristics of 
banks, including size (natural logarithm of total assets), international activity (exposures to other 
jurisdictions over total assets) and complexity (use of derivatives and the structure of liabilities of 
each institution- deposit, interbank, bond and the stock of central bank funding-, divided by total 
assets). Estimates of coefficients of bank-level controls are omitted in the table. At this respect, 
the estimate of the coefficient of Bond funding is statistically significant and positive in columns 2 
(*) and 3 (**), and the estimate of the coefficient of Size is significant and negative in column 5 (*). 
No other estimates are significantly different from zero. The specification includes bank-fixed 
effects in all columns and time-fixed effects in columns 4 to 6.  
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Table 8. What if being a weak bank has been the norm? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This table explores drivers of changes in domestic sovereign bond holdings as well as 
the preference of banks for home sovereign bonds and higher-yielding EMU sovereign debt. The 
dependent variables are: the quarterly percentage change in holdings of domestic sovereign 
bonds of each bank (holdings trimmed at 100% QoQ to avoid outliers); “Ratio 1”or s the ratio of 
holdings of Spanish government bonds to the entire portfolio of sovereign debt; “Ratio 2” or the 
ratio of holdings of Spanish government bonds to holdings of MAC government debt, including 
Spanish bonds in the denominator; “Ratio 3” or the ratio of holdings of Spanish government 
bonds to a portfolio formed by these bonds and LAC government debt; and “Ratio 4” or the ratio 
of holdings of MAC government debt, excluding Spanish government debt, to holdings of bonds 
issued by all non-domestic EMU governments. T1 is the Tier 1 capital ratio. Fragmentation is the 
first lag of a financial fragmentation measure derived from an index for EMU markets developed 
by the ECB (the index is bounded between zero and one; when close to one, financial 
fragmentation rises). Size is total assets of each bank (we take the natural logarithm) and 
Cross_claims are banks´ exposures to other jurisdictions divided by total assets. The specification 
incorporates a vector of (lagged) bank-level variables to control for characteristics of banks (use of 
derivatives and the structure of liabilities of each institution- deposit, interbank, bond and the 
stock of central bank funding-, divided by total assets). Estimates of coefficients of bank-level 
controls are omitted in the table. At this respect, the estimate of the coefficient of Bond funding is 
statistically significant and positive in column 1 (*). No other estimates are significantly different 
from zero. The specification includes bank-fixed effects. 
  
Dependent var iable
Quarterly changes in 
home sovereign debt 
(in percent)
Ratio1: Home bonds 
to total bonds       
Ratio 2: Home bonds to 
(home bonds + non-
local MAC bonds)
Ratio 3: Home bonds 
to (home bonds + 
LAC bonds) 
Ratio 4: Non-local 
MAC bonds          
to all non-local bonds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Fragmentation 13.32** 30.24*** 24.25** 9.750** 4.437
(5.930) (9.544) (9.238) (3.625) (21.43)
T1 -0.721 -0.818 -0.665 -0.055 -0.245
(0.567) (0.631) (0.538) (0.234) (1.218)
Size -13.81 -12.46 -13.93* 2.657 -13.77
(11.89) (7.962) (6.595) (5.397) (28.66)
CROSS 0.0225 -0.372 -0.385 0.009 1.199*
(0.329) (0.433) (0.409) (0.160) (0.617)
CBfunding 2.498*** -0.178 -0.271 0.083 0.549
(0.615) (0.198) (0.194) (0.064) (0.562)
CBfunding x T1 0.487* -0.0826 -0.0864 0.002 -0.0562
(0.237) (0.0980) (0.0929) (0.028) (0.167)
Observations 500 464 464 461 459
Bank controls Y Y Y Y Y
Bank fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y
Time fixed effects N N N N N
Number of banks 14 13 13 13 13
Overall R^2 0.039 0.316 0.249 0.266 0.362
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses and are clustered at the bank level: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Dependent variable
Ratio1: 
Home 
bonds to 
total bonds  
Ratio 2: 
Home 
bonds to 
(home 
bonds + 
non-local 
MAC 
bonds)
Ratio 3: 
Home 
bonds to 
(home 
bonds + 
LAC 
bonds) 
Ratio 4: 
Non-local 
MAC 
bonds     
to all non-
local 
bonds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
WEAK -23.90 -23.78 -23.45 -15.69 -15.55 -4.523 -32.69
(17.24) (17.27) (16.75) (11.36) (9.899) (7.130) (28.77)
PRICE10Y -0.183 -0.170
(0.372) (0.371)
PRICE10Y x WEAK 0.184 0.181
(0.483) (0.482)
CBfunding 3.056*** 2.818*** 2.627*** 1.972*** -0.111 -0.0508 -0.0674 -0.0419
(0.650) (0.618) (0.721) (0.586) (0.156) (0.112) (0.163) (0.559)
CBfunding x WEAK -2.823*** -2.660*** -3.105*** 0.114 -0.110 0.147 0.381
(0.797) (0.817) (0.819) (0.175) (0.173) (0.126) (0.824)
Fragmentation 21.60*** 19.27*** 23.36*** 11.89** 16.04** 19.94
(6.941) (6.425) (6.863) (4.871) (6.222) (16.54)
LTRO-2 14.90*
(8.760)
LTRO-2 x WEAK -10.75
(11.65)
NPLbank -0.933* -0.821*
(0.499) (0.435)
NPLbank x WEAK 0.671
(0.436)
WEAK35 -7.378
(14.00)
NPLbank x WEAK35 0.760*
(0.414)
CBfunding x WEAK35 -2.516***
(0.803)
Observations 660 660 660 660 473 473 473 463
Bank controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Bank fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time fixed effects N N Y Y N N N N
Number of banks 37 37 37 37 23 23 23 23
Overall R^2 0.032 0.034 0.152 0.147 0.132 0.192 0.096 0.264
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses and are clustered at the bank level: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Quarterly changes in home sovereign debt      
(in percent)
Table 9. New aggregation strategy: composition of banking groups at each date 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The table uses a different approach to aggregate bank-level information, in which we 
take the composition of banking groups at each date. Dependent variables are: the quarterly 
percentage change in holdings of domestic sovereign bonds of each bank (holdings trimmed at 
100% QoQ to avoid outliers); “Ratio 1”or s the ratio of holdings of Spanish government bonds 
to the entire portfolio of sovereign debt; “Ratio 2” or the ratio of holdings of Spanish 
government bonds to holdings of MAC government debt, including Spanish bonds in the 
denominator; “Ratio 3” or the ratio of holdings of Spanish government bonds to a portfolio 
formed by these bonds and LAC government debt; and “Ratio 4” or the ratio of holdings of 
MAC government debt, excluding Spanish government debt, to holdings of bonds issued by all 
non-domestic EMU governments. WEAK (WEAK 35) is a dummy equal to one when a bank 
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has, in the preceding quarter, a Tier 1 capital ratio (T1) below the median (35th percentile) value 
of the T1 of our sample of banks, and it is zero otherwise. PRICE10Y is the quarterly 
percentage change in the price of the 10 year on the run Spanish government bond. 
CBfunding is the quarterly variation of funding from the central bank (adjusted for assets 
against this institution) divided by total assets. Fragmentation is the first lag of a financial 
fragmentation measure derived from an index for EMU markets developed by the ECB (the 
index is bounded between zero and one; when close to one, financial fragmentation rises). 
LTRO-2 is a dummy equal to 1 in 2012Q1. NPLbank is the lagged difference between the non-
performing loans ratio (NPL) of each bank (considering only its business activities in Spain) 
minus the average NPL of the whole banking system at time t-1. Estimates of coefficients of 
bank-level controls are omitted in the table. At this respect, the estimate of the coefficient of 
trading derivatives is statistically significant and positive in columns 1 (*), 2 (*), 5(**), 6(***), and 
significant and negative in 8(**). The estimate of cross exposures to total assets (adjusted for 
sovereign holdings) is negative and significant in column 6. Finally, Bond funding is significant 
and positive in column 3 (*).No other estimates are significantly different from zero. All 
specifications include bank-fixed effects, while some incorporate time-fixed effects, too. 
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Figure 1. Holdings of domestic sovereign bonds 
 
SOURCE: Statistical Data Warehouse. 
As reported by Monetary Financial Institutions (MFI) in each country excluding the 
European System of Central Banks. Debt holdings of more affected and less affected by the 
crisis banking systems (from now on, MAC and LAC systems) weighted by MFI assets of each 
country. LAC banks are MFI based in Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Luxembourg, Malta, The Netherlands and Slovakia. MAC banks are MFI based in Cyprus, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain. The shaded area represents the sovereign 
crisis period (2010Q2-2012Q3). 
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Figure 2. Sovereign yields and Return on Equity (RoE) of banks as of 2012Q2 
 
SOURCE: Statistical Data Warehouse and Reuters. 
LAC banking systems in the figure: AT (Austria), Belgium (BE), Finland (FI), France (FR), 
Germany (DE) and The Netherlands (NL). MAC banking systems in the figure: Ireland (IE), Italy 
(IT), Portugal (PT), Slovenia (SI) and Spain (ES). Greece not included in the figure (no data for 
ROE). Yields are computed over the 10 year on-the-run Treasury note.  
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Figure 3. EMU more affected by the crisis banks: funding from Eurosystem lending 
operations and holdings of domestic sovereign bonds 
 
SOURCE: Statistical Data Warehouse and Bruegel database of Eurosystem lending operations 
developed in Pisani-Ferry and Wolff (2012).  
MAC banks are banks based in Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Slovenia and 
Spain. The shaded area represents the sovereign crisis period (2010Q2-2012Q3). 
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Figure 4. GDP and holdings of domestic sovereign bonds in more and less affected by 
the crisis banking systems 
 
SOURCE: Statistical Data Warehouse and Eurostat. 
Debt holdings as reported by Monetary Financial Institutions (MFI) in each country 
excluding the European System of Central Banks, and weighted by MFI assets of each 
country. GDP changes weighted according to nominal GDP in each group. MAC countries are 
Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain. LAC countries are Austria, 
Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Malta and the Netherlands. The 
shaded area represents the sovereign crisis period (2010Q2-2012Q3).  
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Figure 5. Holdings of government debt issued by countries less affected by the crisis 
 
SOURCE: ECB (Securities Holdings Statistics by Sector) and Statistical Data Warehouse. 
As reported by deposit-taking corporations in each country, excluding home bonds. 
Debt holdings of MAC and LAC banks weighted by MFI assets of each country. LAC banks are 
banks based in Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Malta, the 
Netherlands and Slovakia. MAC banks are banks based in Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal, Slovenia and Spain. Shaded area: sovereign crisis period (2010Q2-2012Q3). 
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Figure 6. Holdings of government debt issued by countries more affected by the crisis 
 
SOURCE: ECB (Securities Holdings Statistics by Sector) and Statistical Data Warehouse. 
As reported by deposit-taking corporations in each country, excluding home bonds. Debt 
holdings of MAC and LAC banks weighted by MFI assets of each country. LAC banks are banks 
based in Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Malta, the 
Netherlands and Slovakia. MAC banks are banks based in Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, 
Slovenia and Spain. The shaded area represents the sovereign crisis period (2010Q2-2012Q3). 
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Figure 7. Financial fragmentation in EMU markets 
 
SOURCE: ECB. 
The shaded area represents the sovereign crisis period (2010Q2-2012Q3). 
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